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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it
Found Appellant Had Earned $3,800 Per Month.
Standard of Review: "An appellate Court will not reverse the findings of
fact of a trial Court sitting without a jury unless they are. . . clearly erroneous."
(quoting MacKav v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995). Moreover, in those
instances in which the trial Court's findings include inferences drawn from the
evidence, the findings will be upheld unless the logic upon which their
extrapolation from the evidence was based "is so flawed as to render the inference
clearly erroneous:' State v. Briggs, (2008) UT 75,1fl 1, 197 P.3d 628,631, quoting
Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, (2007) UT 56, 118, 184 P.3d 791.
II. Issue: The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it
Chose Not To Deduct $27,207.59 from Appellant's Earnings.
Standard of Review:

Same as Issue I above.

III. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When
it Awarded the Appellant Her Unpaid Wages as Part of
the Division of Marital Assets.
Standard of Review: Same as Issues I and II above. A valuation or
distribution issue is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review.
Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, (2008) UT App 11, flM, 176 P.3d 476 ("We defer
1

to the trial Court in its findings of fact related to property valuation and
distribution). See Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209,1211 (Utah App. 1991)
"Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard
of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial Court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (internal quotation marks omitted).
IV. Issue : The Decree of Divorce Entered in this Case is Not A
"Punitive" Decree and is Not Contrary to Utah Law.
The plain error exception enables the appellate court to "balance the need
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d
116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989). At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit us
to avoid injustice. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 n.8. (Utah 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This divorce case was tried before the bench on August 4th and 5th, 2008,
Judge Denise P. Lindberg residing. The Court, upon the conclusion of the case,
took the matter under advisement. The Court entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order on October 15, 2008.l There were numerous post
trial pleadings filed and on April 15, 2009 the matter resulted in entry of a Decree
of Divorce based on the findings. Appellant then filed her Notice of Appeal. R. at

appellant's opening Brief failed to attach as an Addendum the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order filed October 15, 2008, and the Decree of
Divorce, filed April 15, 2009. Appellee hereby attaches both pleadings as an
Addendum hereto. R. at 1704-1721; (Findings); 1907-1927 (Decree).
2

1704-1721, 1907-1927, 1968-1969.
Appellant, the wife in this divorce case, in an effort to get what she wanted,
decided at the beginning of the case (3 + years prior to trial) that she was going to
hide hundreds of thousands of dollars of compensation owed her for her services
over many years to a family Trust she had worked for, and eventually taken
control over. This Trust is worth millions of dollars. Comfortable in her position
of control, she determined she could avoid sharing her compensation with her
husband and at the same time reap the benefit of his hard earned monies.
Appellant, over the course of this case and up to trial, repeatedly denied any
right to income from the Trust for her full-time labor for many years. She
repeatedly signed things and verbally represented under oath that any monies she
had taken over the years were "gifts", not compensation.
Appellee knew this position was untrue in his heart, but struggled with
proof in that Appellant controlled the Trust, including its records. Appellee had
worked for his adult life and saved money, operating a crane, with the hope that
upon retirement the parties would live comfortably with the money from the Trust
they were owed.
On the eve of trial Appellant become fearful that her scheme would be
discovered through testimony of her siblings and others, and in a surprise move,
finally admitted that Appellee was right and that she was entitled to a substantial
amount of compensation for her services to the Trust.
3

The following trial was interesting as substantial evidence, witness needs,
documents, and strategy had been turned upside down with the dilatory admission
of the key fact in the case.
The Court then was tasked with having to calculate Appellant's
compensation given Appellant's complete lack of credibility and new strategy
aimed at minimizing her compensation claim.
As all trial judges are forced to do, the Court believed some evidence over
other evidence based on credibility and reliability. Appellant appeals the Court's
findings of fact in relation to the compensation and it is clear to Appellee that this
Appeal is without merit. There is reliable evidence to support the three findings
this Appeal challenges, and merely because the Court did not believe some of the
evidence "created" and not corroborated by Appellant, she is upset. The standard
of review is "clearly erroneous". This Appeal does not meet that standard. Fees
and costs should be awarded Appellee.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Appellant's "Statement of Facts" she does not set forth all the relevant
facts applicable to the appealed issues that were presented to the trial Court. In
fact, a careful review of the Appellant's alleged facts indicate that most are not
relevant to the issues raised on Appeal (see, #s 1,2,3,5,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 and
21). Appellant's remaining "facts" are not in all respects a true rendition of the
record. For example, Appellant's facts #17 and #19 relating to admission of
4

exhibits #22 and #50 fail to clarify that although the exhibits were admitted into
evidence, they were NOT agreed to as to truthful and did not therefore
automatically become uncontested facts. Quite to the contrary, the credible
testimony and the ultimate findings of the Court were that the exhibits were not
truthful or reliable, and that credible evidence contradicted said exhibits. The
mere fact that Appellee allowed the exhibits to be admitted into evidence did not
make them true. It should be noted that each of those two exhibits were generated
by the Appellant, or her counsel for the Trust, and contradict her sworn testimony
in the case. Lastly, Appellant's fact #26 is untrue. The Court did not conclude
that the monies "allegedly" paid by the Trust to the Appellant for services and
consumed by the parties was a reliable fact. Appellee did not contest the
admission of exhibit #22 (wherein the monies are addressed) but thereafter
presented evidence to the court's satisfaction that it was unreliable and the Court
so found.
The Appellant also omits key facts that are essential to understanding the
trial Court's findings in this case. Some of the facts not clearly stated or omitted
completely by Appellant are as follows:
1.

Petitioner knowingly and repeatedly lied in her Court filings and in

this litigation consistently over three years. Through cross-examination at trial,
Petitioner's testimony was repeatedly shown to have been untruthful and evasive.
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at^flO).
5

2.

The Appellant admitted under cross examination at trial that she

repeatedly lied in her deposition under oath when she represented that she was
NOT entitled to any money from the trust. (T 2027 at 139, lines 16-19).
3.

The Appellant admitted under cross examination at trial that during

the three years of discovery and related requests thereto, for every discovery
request ever done in the case, formally or informally, Appellant lied when she
consistently represented that she was not entitled to any wages for her work for the
Trust. (T 2027 at 139, lines 20-25).
4.

Up to approximately one week before the beginning of trial in this

matter, Appellant stood behind her repeated lies. (T 2027 at 140, lines 1-4).
5.

Appellant's pattern of lying also included, in addition to the failure

to disclose hundreds of thousands of dollars due her for her work for the family
Trust, lies about her other assets. (T 2027 at 141-142, lines 18-4).
6.

Appellant even went so far as to state under oath in her deposition

that she was NOT employed at all for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
2005, 2006 and to the current date of the deposition. (T 2027 at 142-143, lines 525, and 1-15).
7.

Appellant admited under cross examination at trial that she was

employed during all of the years mentioned above by the Trust and that the Trust
owed her for her services. (T 2027 at 143, lines 12-15).

6

8.

Not only did Appellant lie about working, and being owed monies

for her services, she stated that all monies she had received from the Trust during
the relevant years for work she had done were considered by her to be "gifts". (T
2027 at 144, lines 1-8).
9.

Appellant even went so far as to say she had not received

compensation for working for the Trust back to 1998. (T 2027 at 144-145, lines
24-10).
10.

Appellant represented under oath in her deposition that she did NOT

keep track of her time that she worked for the Trust. At trial she submitted an
exhibit (Exhibit #22) that was unsigned, undated, mostly handwritten
representation of her alleged hours worked for days and years for the Trust, and
testified that in fact these were records of time spent working for the Trust. (T
2027 at 148-149, lines 20-25 and 1-21, and Exhibit #22).
11.

The hours Appellant finally submitted on the eve of trial to indicate

all work done for the Trust and the compensation owed indicated among other
suspicious things that she had worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for 5 straight
weeks. Her hourly pay for that month alone would be $8,424.00. (Exhibit #22)
12.

The Appellant admits to misleading counsel for Appellee during the

pendency of the case by not telling the truth "Q: Were you not frank with me in
your deposition?" A: "I was not frank with you." Q: Many times, correct?" A:
"Correct". (T 2027 at 149, lines 18-21.
7

13.

Appellant claims she lied to Ford Motor Credit to get a loan. (T

2027 at 164, lines 5-6).
14.

In cross-examination at trial Appellant finally admitted that she lied

repeatedly in this case to get what she wants. (T. at 164, lines 7-13, Q: "have you
lied repeated times in this case, Ms. Richins, - repeated times, numerous times, to
get what you want? A: "Yes").
15.

The Court found that Appellant's testimony utterly lacked credibility

and should be given weight only to the extent there was corroborative evidence to
support it. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at ^flO)
16.

Appellant testified that she is a co-trustee for the Helen Powell

Family Trust. ( T 2027 at 94, lines 18-20).
17.

Appellant testified when asked how many years she had been a

trustee that she didn't know for sure, stating "I d o n ' t . . . six year, seven, I don't
know". (T 2027 at 151, lines 7-9).
18.

Appellant testified that she didn't know what agreement was made

as far as payment to her from the trust. "I don't really know it..." (T. at 2027
127 line 25).
19.

Appellant testified that she has authority to write checks from the

Trust bank accounts. (T 2027 at 153, lines 4-9).

8

20.

Appellant testified that as co-trustee she did not keep a

contemporaneous record of the time she worked for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148,
lines 20-25, T. at 149, lines 1-3).
21.

Appellant testified that she had to re-create records in order to

submit a claim to the Trust as reflected in her personally manufactured Appellant's
Exhibit #22. (T 2028 at 237, lines 8-10).
22.

Appellant testified that she did submit the application to Ford Motor

Credit and that she authorized and stood behind the information provided on that
application. (See Respondent's exhibit #28, T 2027 at 166, lines 24-25, T 2027 at
167, lines 1, 2. Exhibit 28).
23.

Appellant applied for the loan from Ford Motor Company

individually, not in the name of the Trust, and the application (Exhibit 28) does
not indicate Appellant applied in the name of the Trust or as trustee of the Trust.
(T 2027 at 220 at lines 10-14).
24.

Appellant testified that she recognized and was familiar with the

balance sheet of the Trust prepared in September 2000, which indicated the Trust
was worth over $3.2 million. (T 2027 at 179, lines 10-18).
25.

Appellant claims the [Powell Family Trust] did not have the liquid

ability to pay her while at the same time she admits that the Trust was giving her
and each of her 4 siblings "gift" payments of $500 per month, from May 2001
until January 2005. (T 2027 at 121, lines 20- 25, T 2027 at 122, line 1-17).
9

26.

Appellant submitted two separate sworn Financial Declarations to

the Court, neither of which described or listed her claim to wages owed from the
Trust, among other glaring omissions and misstatements under oath. (See Pet. ex.
59, Resp. ex. 33).
27.

The Court found that although Petitioner had control of the Trust and

could have paid herself for her services at the time they accrued, Appellant
intentionally chose not to withdraw those funds but to shelter them in the Trust as
unrecognized income. (See Findings of Fact f 15).
28.

Exhibit #22 was prepared by Appellant to show alleged payments of

$27,207.50 to her and Appellee for work for the trust. (See Exhibit 22, T 2027 at
124 lines 15-17, T 2027 at 125-126, lines 19-2).
29.

Appellee testified contrary to Exhibit #22 that he in fact disputed the

accounting of Appellant for hours worked for the trust, and stated contrary to
Exhibit #22 that he in fact did NOT get paid according to the representations in
said exhibit. (T 2028 at 387 lines 2-25 to T 2028 at 388, lines 1-5).
30.

The Court found that although Petitioner is technically a co-trustee

of the Trust (with her mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggested
that Petitioner had exercised full control over the Trust's assets and had used the
Trust structure in whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal
interest. (See Findings of Fact Tf 18).
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31.

Appellant repeatedly requested (and the Court complied) that the

Court award her the party's marital residence, a non liquid asset, which has a value
of $181,000.00 (T 2027 at 19 lines 14-19, and T 2028 at 430 line 16).
32.

The Decree of Divorce equally divides the marital estate by

awarding each party the equivalent of 50 percent of every dollar of value
determined by the Court to be a part of the estate. In fact, the Decree awarded
Appellee as part of his 50% almost three times the amount of IRA funds (not
liquid by definition of Appellant). {See Decree of Divorce).
33.

Both parties were awarded various types of assets, including

substantial cash, personal and real property, pension or retirement related
accounts. In fact, by the time of trial the marital estate had a net value of over
$760,000, after already paying out equally to the parties approximately $400,000
earlier in the litigation. The net value was therefore approximately 1.16 million
dollars. {See Decree of Divorce).
34.

Nowhere in the Decree of Divorce, nor the Findings of the Court,

does the Court mention or even infer that it is giving Appellee an advantage in the
distribution of assets, in amount or type, or to punish, or to in anyway react
punitively against the Appellant for her actions in the case. {See Decree of Divorce
and Findings of Fact).

11

ARGUMENT
This Appeal is simply an attack on the findings (three of them) of the trial
Court. After a review of the trial transcript it is clear that the Judge had ample
evidence to support her rulings. This is a case where the Appellant simply
disagrees with the result, not one where the lower Court made any errors. The
Appellate Court is not to revise any findings of fact of the trial Court unless they
find them to be clearly erroneous (MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah
1995).
The broad discretion accorded the trial Court in making findings,
particularly in the context of a divorce proceeding, simply acknowledges that the
trial Court is seeking to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and
that the trial Court is best suited to weigh the evidence because "the trial judge has
observed 'facts' such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to
appellate courts. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998) (quoting State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 Utah 1984).
The present case was a bench trial. "In a bench trial or other proceeding in
which the judge serves as fact finder, the Court has considerable discretion to
assign relative weight to the evidence before it. This discretion includes the right
to minimize or even disregard certain evidence." Thus, we defer to the trial
Court's assessment on this matter. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT
12

72, ^{75, 99 P.3d 801. In this case, as the Appeals Court will quickly see, the lower
Court did in fact disregard certain evidence, and rightfully so.
Although there were other witnesses that testified in the trial, the only
witnesses that testified on the issues of this appeal were the parties. There were
also very few documents presented on the issues being appealed, thus making this
review really quite narrow. In fact, Appellant's Appeal rides solely on Exhibit
#22. That Exhibit will be herein examined, as the trial Court did, and found to be
severely lacking in credibility. The record at trial, based on the testimony of the
parties and the documents presented clearly shows that the lower Court had
sufficient evidence to support its findings and conclusions on each any every issue
that form the basis of this Appeal.
There are four (4) issues the Appellant is asking this Court to review.
Following is Appellee's position on each:
I. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it
Found Appellant Had Earned $3,800 Per Month.
As stated in the Statement of Facts above, the Appellant contended for over
three years during the pendency of this litigation that she was not to be
compensated for working for her family Trust, and that said Trust owed her
nothing for her services. Appellee tried through letters, written discovery,
depositions, and third party witnesses, to prove that in fact the full time and efforts
that Appellant spent "working" for the Trust of her parents for many years was for
13

compensation and that she was lying. The trial Court recognized this when it said
in its Findings, "It is undisputed that the Trust documents authorized payment for
compensation of trustees who workfor the Trust. Neverthelesss, through much of
the pendency of this case Petitioner (Appellant) adamantly denied, under oath,
that she had a compensation arrangement with the Trust. Instead, she asserted
that her services to the Trust were in a volunteer capacity to help her parents.
Petitioner's belated acknowledgment that she is owed compensation by the Trust
did not occur untilJuly 30, 2008-practically on the eve of trial. " Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order at page 4, footnote 6.
On the "eve of trial", Appellant for the first time, and totally contrary to
copious under oath representations to the contrary, finally relented and admitted
that she was in fact entitled to substantial compensation for several years from the
Trust. This admission sparked a serious debate about how to properly calculate
that compensation given the credibility issues presented by the historical denials of
the Appellant on the issue. Literally tens of thousands of dollars and months
turning into years could have been avoided had this truth been revealed earlier,
instead of secreted away until the pressure of trial and potential discovery brought
Appellant to at least a portion of truth. Indeed, the Court stated in her Findings
i(

Appellant's testimony utterly lacked credibility and should be given weight only

to the extent there was corroborative evidence to support it " (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order at 110).
14

On the eve of trial and at trial, Appellant presented a self serving, undated,
unsigned, handwritten exhibit purported to be a calculation of what the Trust
owed her (See Exhibit 22). She concluded based on their Exhibit that the Trust
owed her some $118,000 for her many years of service. Appellee disagreed with
the calculations and amounts but was relieved with the admission that at least
some amount was due. Although not objecting to the admission of Exhibit #22,
Appellee made it clear that he did not agree to its content or reliability (see
additional statements of fact below on the credibility problems with Exhibit #22).
In contrast, Appellee put into evidence Exhibit #28, a Ford Motor Credit
Application, wherein the Appellant applied for a loan during the relevant time
period. This document was a loan application form prepared by a third party,
filled out admittedly at the direction of Appellant herself, signed as
acknowledged by Appellant, and used to secure money from a lending
institution. The Court in its discretion found the loan application to be an
admission against interest, more credible, and used the same to help fashion a
finding on the compensation owed the Appellant from the Trust. (See Findings,
Tf's 13 and 14). This finding is being appealed as clearly erroneous.
For the Appellant to claim that the Court somehow based its finding on
"inference" or "speculation" is clearly unsupported by the record. The loan
application is clearly evidence that the Court could and in fact did rely on. A
simple reading of the Court's Findings, paragraphs 13 and 14, puts an abrupt end
15

to this issue on appeal. At one point the Court stated on the issue "Whether or
not those representations to Ford Credit were truthful the Court finds that it is
fair and appropriate to hold Petitioner (Appellant) to the certification she made
in that credit application as an admission against interest. Therefore, the Court
finds that during the term of the marriage Petitioner was employed by the Trust
for no less than 82.3 months at a gross montly wage of $3,800per month, for
total gross imputed earnings during the period of $312,740. " Findings at ^f 14.
It seems that Appellant in her brief is arguing that because she lied so many
times, that the Court committed clear error in using one of her "alleged" lies to
determine her compensation. It seems illogical for the Appellant to argue that the
Court should have believed one purported false document submitted by Appellant
over another. Appellant argues that a letter, put into evidence without testimony
of its author (who did not testify nor present himself for cross examination, (See
Exhibit #50), together with the document put together by Appellant herself (See
Exhibit #22), and another loan application3 that was not put into evidence or
testified to by anyone at trial are uncontroverted. This is simply wishful thinking.
Note that appellant now claims she lied in the Ford loan application as
well. (T 2027 at 149, lines 18-21)
3

Appellant argues there is another credit application in the year 2003. This
application is not an exhibit in this case. It is unclear how Appellant now tries to
rely on a document she herself failed to put in evidence or argue at trial. The
Appellant was unable in her brief herein to corroborate her position that the 2003
loan application is relevant given the fact that she chose NOT to introduce the
16

It is not this Court's obligation to undertake an independent assessment of
the evidence presented during the course of trial and reach separate findings with
respect to that evidence. Rather, it is to endeavor only to evaluate whether the
Court's findings are so lacking in support that they are against the clear weight of
the evidence.
The trial court was tasked to weigh the evidence presented on each and every
issue of this case. The Court presided over this two day trial, took copious notes,
participated in the examination of witnesses as she saw fit, and spent over two
months before making her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. She
then entertained extensive post trial motions and had ample opportunity to
reconsider all of her Findings and Conclusions and Order before signing the
Decree of Divorce.
This Appeals Court has been asked to review the results of the bench trial for
sufficiency of evidence in this case and to determine if the lower Court did
something that was "clearly erroneous". "When reviewing a bench trial for

2003 application into evidence, and she also more importantly chose NOT to
testify about the application, nor bring it up anywhere in the proceedings before
the Judge during the two day trial. To speculate and try to infer that this document,
which was not even discussed at trial, is now relevant in an analysis of this Court's
review of the lower Court is insincere. Cross examination of this potential
document and the rebuttal testimony it MAY have solicited MAY have been so
damaging to Appellant that she obviously chose not to use said potential evidence
to bolster her position that the Court should consider that evidence over the 2004
application (Exhibit #28) that it decided to rely on.
17

sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, f 5,
84P.3dll67.
This Appeal Court is not tasked with the duty to tell trial Court Judges
which piece of competing evidence they are to adopt, let alone when compared to
a document that was not even a part of the trial at all.
A brief review of just a few of the facts as set forth herein is appropriate
given the Appellant's position that the Court committed reversible error, meaning
it's decision was "clearly erroneous" when it determined the amount of
compensation Appellant was entitled to from the Trust under circumstances where
Petitioner knowingly and repeatedly lied in her Court filings over three years of
discovery. Through cross-examination at trial Petitioner's testimony was
repeatedly shown to have been untruthful and evasive. (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order at f 10). In addition, the Appellant admitted under
cross examination at trial that she repeatedly lied in her deposition under oath
when she represented that she was NOT entitled to any money from the Trust. (T.
at 139, lines 16-19). The Appellant admitted under cross examination at trial that
during the three years of discovery and related requests thereto, for every
discovery request ever done in the case formally or informally, Appellant lied
when she consistently represented that she was not entitled to any wages for her
18

work for the Trust. (T 2027 at 139, lines 20-25). Up to approximately one week
before the beginning of trial in this matter, Appellant stood behind those repeated
lies under oath. (T 2027 at 140 lines 1-4).
Appellant's pattern of lying also included, in addition to the failure to
disclose hundreds of thousands of dollars due her for her work for the family
Trust, lies about her bank accounts. (T 2027 at 141-142, lines 18-4). Appellant
even went so far as to state under oath in her deposition that she was not even
employed for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and to the
current date of the deposition. (T 2027 at 142-143, lines 5-25, and 1-15).
Appellant admitted under cross examination at trial that she was employed during
all of the years mentioned above by the Trust and the Trust owed her for her
services. (T 2027 at 143, lines 12-15). Not only did Appellant lie about her
working, and being owed monies for her services, she represented time and time
again under oath that all monies she had received from the trust for work she had
done were "gifts". (T 2027 at 144, lines 1-8).
Appellant represented under oath in her deposition that she did NOT keep
track of her time that she worked for the Trust. At trial she submitted an exhibit
(Exhibit #22) an unsigned, undated, handwritten representation of her alleged
hours worked for days and years for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148-149, lines 20-25
and 1-21, and Exhibit #22).
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The Appellant has no credibility, and her "testimony" in the exhibit she
created (Exhibit #22) also has no credibility. Just because she wrote the lie
rather than merely said it, it is the same. The Appellant admits to misleading
counsel for Appellee during the pendency of the case by not telling the truth "Q:
Were you not frank with me in your deposition?" A: "I was not frank with you."
Q: Many times, correct?" A: "Correct". (T 2027 at 149 lines 18-21). Appellant
claims she lied to Ford Motor Credit to get a loan. (T 2027 at 164, lines 5-6).
Although initially trying to evade the question, Appellant admitted at trial that
she has lied repeatedly in this case to get what she wants. (T 2027 at 164, lines
7-13) the Appellant stated to the Q: "have you lied repeated times in this case,
Ms. Richins, - repeated times, numerous times, to get what you want? A:
"Yes"). The Court found that Appellant's testimony utterly lacked credibility
and should be given weight only to the extent there was corroborative evidence
to support it. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at^flO).
Appellant testified that she is a co-trustee for the Helen Powell Family
Trust. (T 2027 at 94, lines 18-20). Appellant testified when asked how many
years she had been a trustee that she didn't know for sure, stating "I d o n ' t . . . six
year, seven, I don't know". (T 2027 at 151, lines 7-9). Appellant testified that
she didn't know what agreement was made as far as payment to her from the
trust. "I don't really know it..."(T 2027 at 127 line 25). Appellant testified
that she has authority to write checks from the Trust bank accounts. (T 2027 at
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153, lines 4-9). Appellant testified that as co-trustee she did not keep a
contemporaneous record of the time she worked for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148
lines 20-25, T 2027 at 149, lines 1-3). Appellant testified that she had to recreate records in order to submit a claim to the Trust as reflected in her
personally manufactured Appellant's Exhibit #22. (T 2028 at 237, lines 8-10).
In relation to Exhibit #28, Appellant testified that she did submit the
application to Ford Motor Credit and that she authorized and stood behind the
information provided on that application. {See Respondent's exhibit #28, T 2027
at 166, lines 24-25, T 2027 at 167 lines 1, 2. Exhibit 28). Appellant applied for
the loan from Ford Motor Company individually, not in the name of the Trust,
and the application (Exhibit 28) does not indicate Appellant applied in the name
of the Trust or as trustee of the Trust. (T 2027 at 220 lines 10-14).
Appellee testified contrary to Exhibit #22 that he in fact disputed the
accounting of Appellant for hours worked for the trust, and stated contrary to
Exhibit #22 that he in fact did NOT get paid according to the representations in
said exhibit. (T 2028 at 387, lines 2-25 to T 2028 at 388, lines 1-5).
The Court found that although Petitioner is technically a co-trustee of the
Trust (with her mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggested that
Petitioner had exercised full control over the Trust's assets and had used the
Trust structure in whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal
interest. (SeeF. ofF. 1fl8).
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Even if this Court determines the trial Court made certain "inferences" to
come to the Findings set forth, those inferences do not rise to the level of being
clearly erroneous. For this finding to be reversed, the inference has to be "so
flawed as to render the inference clearly erroneous. State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75,
1111, 197 P.3d. 628, 631, quoting Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank. 2007 UT 56, If 18,
184P.3d791.
In Gillmor v. Gilmor. 745 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert denied
765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), quoting Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengeselischaft 564 P.2d 619, 624 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) the Court provided
guidance on this standard when it stated that an inference to be clearly erroneous
depends on whether it is "a rational and logical deduction from the facts admitted
and established by the evidence, when those facts are viewed in the light of
common experience." The lower Court's finding related to the compensation
Appellant is entitled to from the Trust she worked for and hid income from for
years is certainly not "clearly erroneous" under that standard of review.
In its Findings the trial Court acknowledged and specifically referred to the
existence of all evidence submitted in reference to unpaid wages claimed by
Appellant. The trial Court also weighed the sources of the evidence provided. The
trial Court's findings were well reasoned after a thorough review of all the
evidence submitted. There is absolutely no evidence established by Appellant that

22

the trial Court committed an error. The trial Court's findings and calculations are
rational and logical and based on the facts and evidence presented.
It is the role of the fact finder to assess the credibility of witnesses and to
weigh the evidence, See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Findings of Facts, whether based
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial Court to Judge the
credibility of the witnesses.") State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App.
1990)
The Ford Credit Application (Exhibit #28) was submitted by Appellant to
secure a loan to purchase a vehicle. Since it is a crime to knowingly provide false
information to a lending institution, the applicant has a rather stringent obligation
to provide truthful information. All financial institutions are required to follow
government and state regulations in lending procedures. We can reasonable expect
that Ford Credit required a credit check of the credit worthiness of the applicant
and a review of the debt to income ratio to determine the applicant's ability to
repay the loan. Ford Motor Credit approved Appellant for a loan based on the
information provided in the application. The vehicle was purchased with funds
from this loan and titled in Appellant's name.
Furthermore, it would seem that Appellant to this date continues to earn the
amount imputed to her by the trial Court in this matter. Appellant submitted a
sworn financial statement which she used to support her efforts to secure an
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"Undertaking On Appeal", filed July 14, 2009, wherein she claims post trial wages
from the Powell Family Trust: June 2005 thru June 2009, in an amount of
$171,500. That amount, divided by the relevant time period covered, together
with the 10% monthly rental income the Appellant is entitled to as reflected in her
Exhibit 22, equals a monthly gross income of $3,802.17. It should be duly noted
that the amount the trial Court imputed and in which Appellant brings before this
Court on appeal is likely the same amount Appellant continues to earn from the
Trust for her services, even to this date, well over a year and half one half after the
trial in this matter. (See R. 2024, Statement of Assets and Liabilities (As of June
30, 2009) (See Appellant's exhibit #22 10% Rents 8/01/2001).
II. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When it
Chose Not To Deduct $27,207.59 from Appellants Earnings.
The Appellant would have the Appeals Court once again (as attempted in
Issue I above) force the lower Court to adopt Appellant's desired "evidence" over
compelling and credible contrary evidence. The record is clear that the lower
Court's Findings were not clearly erroneous when it found that Appellant's
testimony was simply not believable as to receipt of $27,207.59 from the Trust as
compensation.
We once again have to go to Appellant's undated, unsigned, handwritten
Exhibit #22 to analyze this claim. The last page of this exhibit included a
computer printout allegedly from a Trust agent (which Appellant controlled) of
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alleged payments the Appellant claims she received from the Trust during the
same time period she was contending (for over three years) she was not employed,
not owed wages of any kind, and in fact any monies she received from the Trust
were "gifts". Now that she has been found to have been lying all this time, she
wants to force the lower Court to adopt her unsubstantiated rewriting of history.
Exhibit #22 is nothing more than a self serving, uncorroborated, faulty, and
unreliable document (or more precisely set of documents) that Appellant created
on the eve of trial to try and reduce her damages when it became apparent her
scheme to hide her compensation from the Trust in the amount of over $300,000
was going to be exposed.
The Appellant spends substantial time trying to extrapolate from the
findings, new facts that would alter the outcome of the Decree. "To succeed in its
challenge to findings of fact, [appellant] may not simply reargue its position based
on selective excerpts of evidence presented to the trial court." ProMax Dev. Corp.
v. Mattson, 943 P.2d at 255 (Utah 1984). Appellant cannot re-write history, nor
can she erase it. Appellant puts forth a lengthy and elaborate effort in trying to
convince this court that she did not have the ability to understand common logic,
let alone articulate in words her response(s) when questioned about her duties as
co-trustee to the family Trust. And yet, Appellant would have this Court believe
that she could re-construct a detailed spread sheet of the hours that she worked for
the trust, and that she could recreate a document that claims to have
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"disbursements" from the Trust. Not one of the disbursements were supported
with any negotiated transaction or copy of item presented for payment. No checks
were presented. No proof of deposits was presented. No witnesses of who
generated the computer printout were called, and nothing credible was put into
evidence that supported the new claim. Exhibit #22 is simply not credible.
The Appellant relies on a footnote mischaracterization in the Court's
Findings to try and force the lower Court into a Finding that it clearly did NOT
make as to Exhibit #22. The Court said in footnote 5 on page 4 of its Findings, in
commenting on the claim that Appellant "alleges" the parties were paid this
$27,207.56 as their "combined earnings from services to the Trust", that this is an
assertion of Appellant, and that Appellee did not dispute that the amount was
consumed by the parties in meeting their marital expenses.
It is true that Appellee did not dispute Appellant's unsupported testimony
that the "alleged" amount was consumed, as Appellee had no information to do so.
How could Appellee prove to the contrary the funds were never received and
were merely made up by Appellant to try and reduce her compensation claim?
Remember this claim only came up days before the trial began. That is
impossible, other than to simply deny the existence of said funds, and to attack the
reliability of the self serving Exhibit #22, which Appellee did quite successfully.
The lower Court agreed in its analysis, and after having referred directly to
the claim of Appellant to the offset, in the next paragraph of its Findings, ]f 14,
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it rejected in total the content and claims as asserted in said Exhibit. The lower
Court considered the proffered evidence, and simply chose not to give it any
weight. That is clearly in the purview of the lower Court, who listened to all the
witnesses and reviewed all the documents and evidence submitted and made a well
reasoned decision on the evidence. To try and extrapolate a footnote into clear
error is again without merit and support. "An appellate Court will not reverse the
findings of fact of a trial Court sitting without a jury unless they are. . . clearly
erroneous." (quoting MacKav v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995).
Moreover, in those instances in which the trial Court's findings include inferences
drawn from the evidence, the findings will be upheld unless the logic upon which
their extrapolation from the evidence was based "is so flawed as to render the
inference clearly erroneous:' State v. Briggs, (2008) UT 75, %l 1, 197 P.3d
628,631, quoting Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, (2007) UT 56, ^18, 184 P.3d 791.
The Court clearly found that there was NO offset to its determination of
compensation owed to the Appellant by the family Trust.
In support of the lower Court's finding that the parties did NOT receive
these funds as compensation for services, Appellee states again some of the
relevant facts the Court had available to her at the time:
1.

Appellant stated under oath in her deposition that she was not even

employed for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and to the
current date of the deposition. (T 2027 at 142-143, lines 5-25, and 1-15).
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2.

Appellant stated during her deposition that all monies she had

received from the trust for work she had done were "gifts". (T 2027 at 144, lines
1-8).
3.

Appellant even went so far as to say she has not received

compensation for working for the Trust back to 1998. (T 2027 at 144-145, lines
24-10).
4.

Appellant represented under oath in her deposition that she did NOT

keep track of her time that she worked for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148-149, lines
20-25 and 1-21, and Exhibit #22).
5.

Although initially trying to evade the question, Appellant admitted at

trial that she has lied repeatedly in this case to get what she wants. (T 2027 at
164 lines 7-13 the Appellant stated to the Q: "have you lied repeated times in this
case, Ms. Richins, - repeated times, numerous times, to get what you want? A:
"Yes").
6.

The Court found that Appellant's testimony utterly lacked credibility

and should be given weight only to the extent there was corroborative evidence
to support it. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at ]fl0).
7.

Appellant testified that she is a co-trustee for the Helen Powell

Family Trust. (T 2027 at 94, lines 18-20).
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8.

Appellant testified when asked how many years she had been a

trustee that she didn't know for sure, stating "I d o n ' t . . . six year, seven, I don't
know". (T 2027, at 151, lines 7-9).
9.

Appellant testified that she didn't know what agreement was made

as far as payment to her from the trust. "I don't really know it..." (T 2027 at
127 line 25).
10.

Appellant testified that she has authority to write checks from the

Trust bank accounts. (T 2027 at 153, lines 4-9).
11.

Appellant testified that as co-trustee she did not keep a

contemporaneous record of the time she worked for the Trust. (T 2027 at 148,
lines 20-25, T 2027 at 149, lines 1-3).
12.

Appellant testified that she had to re-create records in order to

submit a claim to the Trust as reflected in her personally manufactured
Appellant's Exhibit #22. (T 2028 at 237, lines 8-10).
13.

Appellant submitted two separate Financial Declarations to the

Court, neither of which described or listed her claim to wages owed from the
Trust, among other glaring omissions and misstatements under oath. {See Pet. ex.
59, Resp. ex. 33).
14.

The court found that although Petitioner had control of the Trust and

could have paid herself for her services during the time they accrued, Appellant
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chose not to withdraw those funds but to shelter them in the Trust as
unrecognized income". (See F. of F. P. 5 ^|15).
15.

Appellee testified contrary to Exhibit #22 that he in fact disputed the

accounting of Appellant for hours worked for the trust, and stated contrary to
Exhibit #22 that he in fact did NOT get paid according to the representations in
said exhibit. (T 2028 at 387, lines 2-25 to T 2028 at 388, lines 1-5).
16.

The Court found that although Petitioner is technically a co-trustee

of the Trust (with her mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggested
that Petitioner had exercised full control over the Trust's assets and had used the
Trust structure in whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal
interest. (SeeF.ofF.
17.

118).

Moreover, Appellant's Exhibit #22 contending receipt of $27,207.50

in compensation from the Trust was only manufactured by the Appellant in
anticipation of trial, its foundational basis in fact denied repeatedly by Appellant
under oath throughout the three year discovery time period.
18.

Exhibit #22 was presented to Appellee on the eve of trial, after all

witnesses and trial preparation had been basically completed.
19.

Exhibit #22 was admitted into evidence to show how Appellant

came to the conclusions and amounts she wanted the Court to adopt as to her
hidden compensation.
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She presented NO evidence 4 to corroborate the document other than her own
testimony.
Exhibit #50, the letter from the attorney for the Trust, states '7 have
reviewed with my client, Helen M. Powell (the mother of Appellant), the claim in
the amount of $118,699.44 that you submitted on behalf of Rita Richins
(Appellant). Helen confirms that Rita did a lot of work for her and Helen felt
that the hours listed for Rita of10,809.33 hours was reasonable for the time
period listedfrom August 2000 through May 10, 2005. " No independent
analysis was presented, no additional corroborative evidence provided, and
nothing is stated in the letter to give credibility to the claim. In fact, the Trust
would be unable to support the "accounting and claims" because there were no
records kept according to its own trustee. The Trust was faced with the reality of
having to pay a potential claim of over $300,000 (as the Court determined
thereafter based on the more credible evidence) and jumped at the opportunity to
agree to pay approximately one third of that amount. This letter also comes from
the Trust's own counsel, of which Appellant as trustee of the Trust managed as
part of her duties for the Trust.
4

She did NOT present a witness from the Trust. She did deliver a letter
from the Trust counsel (Exhibit #50) dated July 28, 2008, less than one week
before the first day of trial that in NO way provides any proof of the content of
Exhibit #22, but merely states to the effect that the Trust acknowledges the claim
made by Exhibit #22.
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No discovery was conducted in relation to Exhibits #22 or #50, and all prior
discovery was in contradiction to the very premise and alleged factual basis of
both exhibits. There is nothing mentioning this claim in her Docketing
Statement regarding the $27,205.50.
There is simply no credible evidence to corroborative Appellant's "recreation" of the alleged wages she now claims to have earned, nor the page
where she for the first time alleges that she did in fact get paid for some of her
services in the amount of $27,207.56.
There is no credible evidence of any kind to support Appellant's claims that
$27,207.50 in wages were ever paid to either party. When questioned by the
Court if he [Appellee] ever received payments of check, cash or any negotiable
instrument for wages from the Trust Appellee responded "No". (T 2028 at 387
line 18 at 388 line 4). Appellant's testimony gives cause for the Court to
question the validity of Exhibit #22, as Appellant has admitted to lying under
oath, " . . . to get what [she] want[s]". (T 2027 at 164 lines 9-13) (See also, F. of
F. and Conclusions Of Law, TJ10).
In fact, in Appellant's Brief on Appeal she admits that the accounting of
Exhibit #22, even in the light she is attempting to use it, is unreliable and the
computation almost impossible. In her footnote #14 on page 26 of her brief, it is
clear that Appellant herself is unable to make the calculations square up. The
evidence is so unreliable that the Court reasonably decided to simply give no
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weight to said Exhibit #22 and claim, and to instead believe the Appellant's pre
trial position of the monies (if any) being "gifts". It is clearly not erroneous to do
so under the facts. It is not wise to second guess the fact finder in a situation
where there are so many red flags on a single piece of "evidence".
Even a cursory review of the content of Appellant's Exhibit #22 shows how
unreliable and faulty it is. The Appellant presents her alleged "recreated" time
sheet for the year 2001, more specifically March 4, 2001 to April 7, 2001 which
is a five week period. In that five week period, Appellant's accounting that
forms the basis for her claim of compensation indicates she worked 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week for 5 straight weeks. Out of the 35 days only 3 days have less
than 24 hours claimed. Appellant claims she worked a total of 702 hours for
March, 2001, which if the court accepted her hourly wage of $12.00 per hour,
would total $8,424 for the month.
There is no clear error in this Finding.

"[W]e review the trial court's

findings of fact for clear error, reversing only where the finding is against the
clear weight of the evidence, or if we otherwise reach a firm conviction that a
mistake has been made." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255
(UtahCt.App. 1997).

III. Issue : The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error When
it Awarded the Appellant Her Unpaid Wages as Part of
the Division of Marital Assets.
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The trial Court properly imputed compensation from the Trust to
Appellant. Even the Appellant, finally, on the eve of trial admitted that she was
entitled to compensation from the Trust; she only disputed the amount and time
frame. The evidentiary battle ensued on those issues, and Appellant lost. The
Court heard both sides and made an informed ruling. The Court stated
"Therefore, it is fair and appropriate to impute $312,740 in unrecognized income
to Appellant for the period July 1998-MaylO, 2005, rather than to accept the
$118,700, that she and the Trust have acknowledged to be a Marital asset". (See
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order ^fl5, emphasis added). The Court
clearly considered all points of view.
The contention Appellant pursues in this part of her Appeal is the premise
that the Court committed clear error when it awarded Appellant, as part of her
equal split of the marital assets, the compensation claim she has against the Trust,
of which she is a co trustee. Appellant claims that the compensation owed by the
Trust is not "liquid", and therefore the Court committed reversible error when it
treated the asset as "fully liquidated" when dividing the marital estate. The Court
did not treat the asset as "fully liquidated" and explained its reasoning clearly as
stated previously that the asset is not illiquid. This division of assets is one that
should not be interfered with given the lower Courts better view of how assets
should be divided under the circumstances.
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The Appellant foresaw the ruling at trial on this asset, and argued the
liquidity issue there. In fact, the lower Court specifically addressed the concerns
and position of the Appellant in its Findings at fs 16 and 18. At ^f 16, the Court
acknowledged "Petitioner offers two reasons for why she believes it would be
unfair to credit Respondent (Appellee) with half of the value of her deferred
income: ...(2) because the Trust does not have sufficient liquid assets to pay
Petitioner (Appellant) in a lump sum. Petitioner urges the Court to discount the
debt because of the "risk" that she may not be able to collect the full amount from
the Trust. The Court finds that Petitioner's arguments have little

merit".

Findings at page 5, ^ 16. Although this was an effort to reduce the value of the
compensation, the logic surely is the same and the analysis as well as to the
distribution of the asset.
At Tf 18 of its Findings the lower Court made it clear that the evidence
supported her distribution of the marital estate so far as the deferred compensation
claim. The Court stated, "As to the "risk" of not collecting on the unpaid
earnings, although Petitioner is technically a co-trustee of the Trust (with her
mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggests that Petitioner has
exercised full control over the Trust's assets and has used the Trust structure in
whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal interests ". The
Court finds further, "Indeed, according to Petitioner's own testimony, during the
same time she was deferring payments to herself from the Trust for her services,
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she was paying herself and her siblings $500 per month as gifts from the Trust "
On further review of the evidence the Court went on to find that "She has
presented no corroborative evidence to support her claim that during the relevant
time period the Tust was so illiquid that it could not pay her for the services. To
be sure, Petitioner's exhibit 50, a letter dated July 28, 2008, states that the Trust
presently lacks enough "liquid" assets to retire the admitted Trust's financial
obligation to Petitioner. However, nothing in that letter addresses the Trust's
inability during the relevant period (1998-2005) to pay the amounts it owed".
The Court then concluded most appropriately, "Indeed, it is evident from
the gifts paid out during that period (together with rents collected from Trust
properties) that there were liquid assets available to the Trust at the time. It is
also clear from the testimony at trial that the Trust presently owns a number of
other assets that could be sold to retire that obligation ". Then, referring to the
rest of the marital estate which in total had a net value of several hundred thousand
dollars, the Court stated, "Moreover, that is not the only option available.
Because these parties have considerable other asserts to their name, there is
always the option of offsetting the value of Respondent's share of imputed income
from the Trust against other assets of the parties".( See Findings, ^J18).
A valuation or distribution issue is reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard of review. Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ^[44, 176 P.3d
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476 ("We defer to the trial Court in its findings of fact related to property
valuation and distribution. See Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209,1211 (Utah App.
1991) "Findings of fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous
standard of review such that due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." (internal quotation marks
omitted).
"We afford the trial court considerable latitude in adjusting financial and
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity."
Leppert v. Leppert 2009 Utah App 10, \ 9, 200 P.3d 223.
"Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's property division
determination in a divorce action only if there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a serious inequity
has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 2003 Utah
App 282, t 8, 76 P.3d 716. (emphasis added).
Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining . . property
distribution in divorce cases, and [their decisions] will be upheld on appeal unless
a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated". Stonehocker v.
Stonehocker, 2008 Utah App 11, ^j 8, 176 P.3d (omission in original), (emphasis
added).
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"To succeed in its challenge to findings of fact, [appellant] may not simply
reargue its position based on selective excerpts of evidence presented to the trial
court." ProMax Dev. Corp v. Mattson, 943 P.2d at 255.See Newmeyer v.
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1287 (Utah 1987) (giving trial court broad latitude in
dividing Marital estate).
The Appellant takes the untenable position that she is being punished
because she was awarded her compensation claims against the Trust she controls
in the division of marital assets. The reason this seems not genuine is because the
Appellant now states to the effect, shame on you for believing me when I lied for
over three years in the litigation about compensation, and now that I am found to
be entitled to compensation, you should not make me be the responsible party to
collect same.
Appellant interestingly enough in her argument takes the position that the
fiduciary duty she may have under the law prevents her from doing what she has
been doing with this Trust's assets for years. To use this as a defense is to ask this
Court to allow her to use her alleged duties to prevent her from facing the
consequences she caused by her previous violation of those very duties. This
argument alone is reason enough to award her the asset. Who better to collect
against her own Trust? With the contrary and "flip-flopping" positions taken by
the Appellant under oath as to the issue of compensation owed her by the Trust
she manages, to require the Appellee to collect this asset would be nonsense.
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Appellee would be saddled with the task of trying to prove facts that have been
intentionally withheld from him, distorted, and stated to be 180 degrees opposite
in some cases. It was the decision of the Appellant to defer her income, lie about
it, hide it even when under oath, and try to manipulate the Court to find an amount
due of approximately 1/3 of the truth. To ask the Appeals Court to require
Appellee to try and sort this out is not supported by the facts, fairness, common
sense, nor logic.
It is helpful to consider the previous stated facts in this brief in determining
whether the Court's decision on the distribution of the marital estate assets was
clearly erroneous. The Appellee has stated several facts above, and rather than
repeat them again, merely asks the reader to review them in consideration of the
Court's finding that Appellant, not Appellee, should be awarded the compensation
claim against the Trust she controls.
In Appellant's third post trial attempt in her Motion To Stay Pending
Appeal, she incorporates her Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of June 30,
2009. (See R. at 2023-2024) This statement includes a substantial previously
undisclosed asset (a personal injury claim against the Trust for several hundred
thousand dollars that clearly existed at the time of discovery and trial). Appellant
now has a total claim against the Powell Trust and Helen Powell for $590,300 and
declares her total net worth at approximately $750,000. This is a further reason
this Appeals Court should not disrupt the property distribution of the lower Court.
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The dishonest actions of Appellant have complicated the very asset she
endeavored to hide.
It should also be noted when reviewing the issue on appeal as to the
liquidity of claims against the Trust, that under Liabilities on Appellant's Financial
Statement she lists a loan from Helen Powell for $50,000, which Appellant has not
paid back and testified that it could be applied to wages earned, from the Trust.
{See R. at 2024) (T 2027 at 251 line 21 at 252 line 8).
Also represented on a Financial Statement is an entry for $70,000 from the
Powell Family Trust for "advances against claims". It appears that Appellant
continues her efforts to hide her compensation by taking "loans" from the Trust
rather than compensation so as to avoid taxes, and of course to continue the lies
she has stated that she is not entitled to any income.
She now has received $120,000 in cash from the Trust that common sense
would tell us was to reduce the debt the Trust owes her. The Trust agreed it owed
her no less than $ 118,000, and has seemingly paid her more than that already. The
argument on the liquidity of the claim against the Trust is suspect given these
facts. It is clear that Appellant is not concerned about her fiduciary duties and
continues to take loans from the Trust she manages, all while she claims that same
Trust owes her almost $600,000. {See R. at 2023 - 2024).
In Exhibit #50, the letter dated July, 2008 from the as attorney for the Trust
used in support of Appellant's claim for compensation, the attorney states, "Helen
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does not have enough liquid assets at the present time to immediately pay the
entire $118,699.44. However, she will work with her accountant to pay what she
can now and then she will pay the balance to Rita as soon as she can convert some
of her fixed assets into cash. Please be patient with my client for a few months
while she obtains the rest of the funds she will need to pay the balance she owes to
Rita". (See Exhibit #50).
It is clear that the Trust has some liquidity (at least back in July 2008 when
this letter was written), and that it has sufficient assets to become more liquid
within only a few months of July 2008 (almost 2 years ago now) by converting
some assets into cash. Appellant is the trustee of this Trust and although she tries
to fashion Exhibit #50 as an independent letter from the Trust, common sense
would dictate that she continues to control the Trust and is trying to delay once
again her compensation to bolster this Appeal. Why would a Trust properly
managed by an independent person not tell a claimant who is requesting money
for services that loans to that person in the amount of $120,000 should not be
applied to the debt? The liquidity claim fails on its own lack of merit.
IV. Issue: The Decree of Divorce Entered in this Case is Not a
"Punitive" Decree and is Not Contrary to Utah Law.
Appellant frames the issue of punitive decree as a question of law to avoid
the marshaling requirement. In doing so, however, she fails to take advantage of
the opportunity that marshaling provides; to take a second look at the issue in light
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of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial. Consequently, the issue
raised is not meritorious, because it is not discussed in light of the controlling case
law or the controlling standards of review. All facts as set forth herein need to be
considered in the global issue of determining a so called "punitive Decree".
Since Appellant claims the "effect" of the Decree is what is punitive, the
Court must remember that "We afford the trial court considerable latitude in
adjusting financial and property interest, and its actions are entitled to a
presumption of validity." Leppert v. Leppert 2009 UT App 10, If 9, 200 P.3d 223
(quoting Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, ^8, 76 P.3d 716).
"Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's property
Division determination in a divorce action only if there was a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion." (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Court went to great lengths to produce a detailed accounting of the
distribution of marital assets in the Decree, entered April 15, 2009. A review of
the Decree makes it clear that both parties received an equal amount of the marital
assets following the trial of this matter. There is absolutely no evidence inferred or
otherwise to claim the trial Court's findings and distribution of assets under the
Decree are "punitive" to either party. There are no damages awarded to infer the
Court's findings were based on bad faith, malice, fraud, violence or evil intent and
no inference designed as a deterrent for future actions of either party. Appellant
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cannot claim the Decree is punitive simply because she feels the Decree is unfair
to her.
Appellant has tried to manipulate the trial Court's figures to manufacture
and conjure up an appearance of a disproportionate award of marital assets.
Appellant's mathematical assumptions are contrary to the trial Court's Findings
and the Decree, and cannot be used to support her claim that the Decree is not fair
and just as to both parties. A quick example of this is the Appellant's statement at
page 40, the last paragraph, wherein she states that she was awarded "$191,171.35
in marital assets" compared to the Appellee being awarded "$380,372.83, which is
66.55%". This is a statement that flies in the face of the clear reading of the
Decree and the 50/50 allocation of marital assets set forth therein. In order to
support this math, one would have to assume (among other things) that ALL of the
deferred compensation awarded Appellant is worthless. The Appellant completely
disregards the award of compensation to her for her wages owed by the Trust.
Note that Appellant has already received $120,000 cash in the form of loans from
the Trust toward this claim, and she submitted Exhibit (#50) that indicated she
would in fact be paid for her compensation claim, no later than a few months after
July 2008. We are approaching two years since the Trust itself agreed Appellant
would be paid a substantial amount! How can appellant now state to this Court in
good faith that she has NO value in the compensation claim awarded to her?
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Appellant revisits the alimony issue and the Protective Order 5 issue in
discussing her position that the Decree is punitive. The Court merely enforced
Appellant's own under oath withdrawal of the alimony claim (and thereafter
Appellant's prevention of discovery on the underlying facts). It is interesting to
note that the Appeal herein does NOT claim the Court committed error in taking
such action. Alimony is not being appealed, yet it is being stretched beyond
recognition as somehow relevant to the fact that the Court was punishing the
Appellant. If this were the case, she surely would have appealed the alimony
issue. There never was any legitimate alimony issue in this case and Appellant
finally recognizes the same by not appealing the Court's ruling thereon.
"The Appellate Court will not re-weigh the evidence, but view evidence that
supports the trial court's decision in the light most favorable to the trial court's
findings. The broad discretion accorded the trial court in making findings,
particularly in the context of a divorce proceeding, simply acknowledges that the
trial court is seeking to make an equitable distribution of the marital estate and that
the trial court is best suited to weigh the evidence because "the trial judge has
As to the Protective Order, the record needs to be set straight. Appellee
was asked at trial if there was any domestic violence that took place. He answered
"No", because there wasn't any. Appellee was originally charged with D.V. but
was able to prove Appellant lied on the police report to obtain a Protective Order
to have him removed from his home that he had owned for 8 years prior to the
party's marriage. All Domestic Violence (D.V.) charges were dropped against
Appellee, including simple assault D V and damage/interruption of a
communication device. The only charge he pled guiltyto and was charged
with is one class C misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct under §76-9-102.
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observed the facts, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to
appellate courts." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Ut 1998) quoting State v.
Pena, 869 P. 2d 939 (Utah 1994).
The Appellant admits that the Decree is not punitive on its face. Instead the
Appellant claims the "effect" of the Decree is so harmful to her that it is punitive
and that the lower Court judge must have meant to punish her. The only way this
argument holds any substance at all is if the Appellant prevails on her other appeal
issues herein. Accordingly, Appellee incorporates his argument and facts on the
other issues herein to support the trial Court's ruling.
Appellant, as shown herein, has simply ignored the Findings of the Court
herein. The trial Court had the arduous task of being fact-finder in this case
wherein the difficulty of every issue resulted from the actions of Appellant and her
propensity to lie. The lower Court literally left no stone unturned in her search of
truth in this case. Even when, at the eve of trial, Appellant finally admitted that
the Trust did indeed owe her money, when throughout the litigation she adamantly
denied any such claim, the Court could have concluded that Appellant was
actually hiding assets. The trial Court could have in fact done more to reach an
equitable result under the circumstances and awarded the Appellee more of the
assets to compensate him. After all, Appellant intentionally failed to disclose her
claim to wages as an asset, and intentionally took efforts to hide that fact causing
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this case to even go to trial at all. The modest award of a partial amount of
attorney fees to Appellee at the trial level, when Appellee sought substantially
more, clearly indicates the Court did not punish Appellant.
After recognizing Appellant's inappropriate conduct with regards to her
misrepresentations, fabrications and lies under oath in depositions, and in a court
of law, her counsel now infers that the trial Court may have ruled against
Appellant to punish her. The trial Court did not make any indication that the
Findings were anything but a fair and equitable distribution.
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight of
conviction that a mistake has been made.' State v. Gordon, 2004 UT 2, ^5, 84
P.3d 11167 (quoting State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988)
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added).
The plain error exception enables the appellate court to "balance the need
for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d
116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989). At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit
us to avoid injustice. "State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35 n. 8. To demonstrate plain
error, a defendant must establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
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appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.
"State v.Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 (Utah 1993).

CONCLUSION
The trial Court did not commit error as to any of the issues Appellant raises
and there is ample evidence in the record to sustain the trial Court's Findings and
Conclusions. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case,
the trial Court's ruling implements an equitable division of the marital estate. The
Appellant was awarded over $200,000 cash in October 2005 under a temporary
Order in the case. She was awarded the monies she had received under the
Decree, and she was awarded the $120,000 in cash "loans" that she could, and
probably already has converted to her ownership as a result of an admitted claim
for compensation against the Trust. There is simply no punitive aspect to this case
whatsoever. To claim that it is punitive for the Court to point out the credibility
issues in a trial is confusing. This case turned on credibility, and the Appellant
must take responsibility for her actions.
Appellee requests Attorney Fees and Costs for the frivolous issues pursued
on appeal. Appellee requests an award of attorney fees and costs under Utah R.
App. 33 and 24 for Appellant pursuing a frivolous appeal. A frivolous appeal
includes "one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
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based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah
R. App. P. 33(b); see also Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988)
The Utah Court has found, "when a party who received attorney fees below
prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal."
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998).
Based on the well reasoned rulings of the trial Court, the Decree of Divorce
entered should stand. The Appellant has failed in her attempt to show that the
Court committed reversible error when it imputed $3,800 of unpaid earnings,
chose not to deduct any wages or income the parties "allegedly" received from the
Trust, and awarded the compensation asset to Appellant. There is no Punitive
Decree. Based thereon, this Appeal should be dismissed and Appellee awarded
his fees and costs to defend same.

i aa^^Qo f April
April, 2010.
DATED t h iss^^*^ K
^M
TOM D BRANCH, LLC

Tom D Branch
Attorney for Respondent!Appellee James E. Richins
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Decree of Divorce
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
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OCT ! 5 2106
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UIAiL.
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

RITA Y. RICHINS,

tfe:

:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

:

Case No. 054902600

:

Judge Denise Posse Lindberg

Petitioner,
vs.
JAMES E. RICHINS,
Respondent.

f1
A bench trial was held in this case on August 4 and 5, 2008. Petitioner was present and
represented by her counsel, Mary Paxman McGee. Respondent was present and represented by
his counsel, Tom D. Branch. The Court heard testimony and received exhibits offered by both
parties, and took the matter under advisement. After review of the testimony and exhibits the
Court now enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1f2
At the time this divorce Petition was filed, the parties had been residents of Salt Lake
County for at least three months prior to filing. Complaint, at ^[1, Answer, at ^[1.
1f3
The parties began cohabiting in May or June, 1982, they were married on May 26, 1984.
The parties have no children in common.
1f4
The parties separated on May 10, 2005; Petitioner filed her Petition for Divorce on May
12, 2005 alleging emotional and physical abuse.1
]

As a result of an incident that occurred on or about May 10, 2005, Petitioner obtained a
Protective Order against Respondent on May 25, 2005. Concurrently, Respondent was charged
with two misdemeanor domestic violence charges: Simple Assault (DV) and
Damaging/Interrupting a Communication Device. On September 1, 2006, Respondent entered a
plea to an amended misdemeanor count of Disorderly Conduct (DV). At sentencing on
September 11, 2006, Respondent received a fine of $500 which was suspended upon proof of
completion of 75 hours of community service. He was also ordered to undergo an alcohol and
drug evaluation and a domestic violence evaluation and to comply with all recommendations
-1-
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Tf5
On or about October 14, 2005, the parties entered into a Stipulation concerning the partial
distribution of marital assets, the terms of which were read into the record before Commissioner
Casey. The terms of the stipulation were reduced to writing and entered as temporary orders by
this Court on October 27, 2005.
Tf6
Following extensive pretrial motions the case was certified for trial by Commissioner
Casey on November 28, 2007 on the following issues:
•
•
•

•
•

The validity of Petitioner's waiver of alimony.
Petitioner's request to have the Decree enter on the grounds of physical or
emotional cruelty based on past domestic violence.
An offset or credit sought by Respondent based on his claim that Petitioner had
sheltered certain assets (i.e., compensation earned over several years for managing
a family trust) for the purpose of making those assets unavailable to Respondent.
Division of marital assets.
Respondent's request to have the existing protective order dismissed.
Each party's request for attorneys fees.

Validity of Alimony Waiver
\1
In her Petition for Divorce Petitioner initially requested alimony. In subsequent
proceedings Petitioner disclaimed the alimony request, and based on that disclaimer Petitioner
successfully resisted Respondent's efforts to conduct discovery about her financial status.
Thereafter, Petitioner reasserted her alimony request. This Court ruled that Petitioner had waived
her alimony claim. Minute Entry of May 15, 2008. Nevertheless, at trial Petitioner sought to
proffer grounds in support of a renewed claim. Petitioner has provided no facts that would
justify a change to the Court's prior rulings. No material facts have changed since the last time
the Court addressed this issue.
Petitioner's Request to Enter Divorce Decree on the Basis of Fault
f8
In the Divorce Petition filed May 12, 2005, Petitioner requested that the Decree enter on
grounds of "irreconcilable differences." Since then, however, Petitioner has modified her
position and now insists that the Decree be entered on the basis of Respondent's "fault."
Petitioner has a couple of related hurdles to overcome in pursuing fault-based grounds. The first
issue is that Petitioner never sought leave to file an Amended Petition seeking relief on those

from the evaluators. Respondent was placed on unsupervised, good conduct probation to the
court for 12 months. Petitioner's Ex. 1.

-2-
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grounds.2 The second issue is that the DV incident upon which she relies for her present position
had just taken place a couple of days earlier, yet it was not referenced in her Petition. Petitioner
has not explained why it is now so critical that the Decree enter on those grounds, even though
they have never been explicitly pled.
^[9
Issues of fault are most relevant in the context of adjudications involving alimony and
child custody. Neither of those reasons apply here because Petitioner waived any alimony claim
and the parties have no children in common.
Tf 10
Although Respondent's conviction in a domestic violence-related count could support
entering a fault-based Decree, there is plenty of fault attributable to both parties. In addition to
the D V conviction, Respondent has acted wrongfully at other times, such as when he emptied out
various marital bank accounts within days of the parties' separation. For her part, Petitioner has
also acted wrongfully. Specifically, Petitioner has knowingly and repeatedly lied in her Court
filings (e.g., her financial declarations) and during her depositions.3 Through cross-examination
at trial Petitioner's testimony was repeatedly shown to have been untruthful and evasive. Not
only has Petitioner lied in the context of these proceedings, at trial Petitioner was forced to admit
to lying numerous times in various other contexts (e.g., to Ford Motor Credit in order to qualify
for a car loan, to the Salt Lake City Credit Union in an account application) in order uto get what
[she] want[s]." As a result, the Court finds that Petitioner's testimony utterly lacks credibility and
should be given weight only to the extent there is corroborative evidence to support it.
Therefore, if Petitioner insists on a fault-based divorce, the Court finds that fault should be
equally assigned to both parties. Alternatively, the Decree should enter on grounds of
irreconcilable differences as pled in the Petition.
Respondent's Request for Offset/Credit on Distribution of Assets on Basis that Petitioner Hid
Marital Assets in the Family Trust She Controls.

2

To be sure, as referenced at note 1, supra, there has been at least one documented
incident of domestic violence during the parties' marriage. That incident, which took place on or
about May 10, 2005, resulted in the parties' physical separation and in Respondent's subsequent
guilty plea to an amended misdemeanor count of Disorderly Conduct (DV).
Petitioner filed two financial declarations, one dated January 31, 2006, and the other
dated September 14, 2007. In these filings Petitioner declared, under penalty of perjury, that she
had no income, no employment, and no debt. In the 2006 declaration she also stated that she had
no bank accounts, although in the 2007 she lists a number of accounts that had existed at the time
she filed the 2006 declaration. In neither statement did she acknowledge what she subsequently
admitted at trial-that she has a viable claim against her family Trust for approximately $118,700
in past wages. In her depositions Petitioner had denied any right to wages from the Trust, and
further testified that the information in the financial declaration was accurate. At trial, however,
Petitioner was forced to admit that most, if not all, of her representations in those financial
declarations were untruthful.
-3-
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HI 1 Respondent contends that Petitioner has "earned over $45,000 per year since 1995 and
hidden that money in the Powell Family Trust" (the "Trust") by declining to receive payment
from the Trust that she manages as co-trustee with her mother. Respondent requests that the
Court impute and recognize that income and credit him with "an amount equal to his equitable
share in Petitioner's hidden income when the Court divides the estate." Respondent's Trial Brief,
at 7. Specifically, Respondent asks that the Court impute to Petitioner income or assets in the
amount of $399,200 for her work managing the Trust.
1fl2
The parties disagree as to when Petitioner began working for her family's Trust.
Petitioner claims she did not begin working for the Trust until 2000, Respondent claims she
began in 1995. For the reasons stated hereafter, the Court imputes Trust employment to
Petitioner from at least July 1, 1998.
Tfl3
In support of her position Petitioner offers Petitioner's Ex.22. Petitioner alleges that this
undated, unsigned, handwritten exhibit reflects the hours she worked for the Trust between
August 2000 and May 10, 2005.4 According to the exhibit, during that period Petitioner worked a
total of 10,809.33 hours on behalf of the Trust at a rate of $12.00 per hour, resulting in earnings
to her of $129,711.96. Petitioner further claims that during that same period Respondent
performed 259 hours of work on behalf of the Trust (also at $12.00 per hour), for a total of
$3,108.00 in earnings to Respondent. As reflected in the exhibit, Petitioner alleges that of the
parties' combined earnings from services to the Trust, they were paid $27,207.50.5 If Petitioner's
contentions are accepted, it is evident that Petitioner has failed to collect $105,612.46 for hourly
work she performed on behalf of the Trust. But this is not all. Petitioner has also acknowledged
that another part of her compensation was a "management fee" of 10% of rents collected from
properties owned by the Trust. According to the exhibit, that results in another $13,086.98 in
unpaid compensation to Petitioner. In total, Petitioner now concedes that the Trust she manages
is holding at least $118,699.44 in compensation due to her and which she has chosen not to
collect.6 She also acknowledges this is a marital asset. Finally, the Trust has acknowledged in
writing the debt owed to Petitioner. Petitioner's Ex. 50.

4

At trial Petitioner acknowledged that she did not keep contemporaneous records and that
this exhibit is a reconstruction based on other records available to her.
Petitioner asserts, and Respondent does not dispute, that this amount was consumed by
the parties in meeting their marital expenses.
6

It is undisputed that the Trust documents authorized payment for compensation of
trustees who work for the Trust. Nevertheless, through much of the pendency of this case
Petitioner adamantly denied, under oath, that she had a compensation arrangement with the
Trust. Instead, she asserted that her services to the Trust were in a volunteer capacity to help her
parents. Petitioner's belated acknowledgment that she is owed compensation by the Trust did not
occur until July 30, 2008-practically on the eve of trial.
-4-

1fl4
Although Petitioner and the Trust now acknowledge that she has failed to collect
$118,699.44 in wages, Respondent contends that the amounts actually owed by the Trust for
Petitioner's services is far in excess of that amount. In support of this contention Respondent
offers his own exhibit - an application to Ford Motor Credit filed by Petitioner on or about July
31, 2004. Petitioner's Ex. 28. In that application Petitioner listed her occupation as "Estate
Manager," the "Powell Family Trust" as her employer, her monthly salary at "$3,800," and her
time on the job as "6 years." Id. According to this exhibit, Petitioner's documented employment
with the Trust began no later than July 1998, rather than in August 2000 as she contended at trial
and in her exhibit 22.7 Whether or not those representations to Ford Credit were truthful, the
Court finds that it is fair and appropriate to hold Petitioner to the certification she made in that
credit application as an admission against interest. Therefore, the Court finds that during the term
of the marriage Petitioner was employed by the Trust for no less than 82.3 months at a gross
monthly wage of $3,800 per month, for total gross imputed earnings during that period of
$312,740.
^[15
The Court finds that although Petitioner had control of the Trust and could have paid
herself for her services during that time, Petitioner chose to not withdraw those funds but to
shelter them in the Trust as unrecognized income. In the meantime, she placed in the Trust assets
that she used (and continues to use) for her personal benefit. Therefore, it is fair and appropriate
to impute $312,740.00 in unrecognized income to Petitioner for the period July 1998-May 10,
2005, rather than simply to accept the approximately $118,700, that she and the Trust have
already acknowledged to be a marital asset.
^f 16
Petitioner offers two reasons for why she believes it would be unfair to credit Respondent
with half of the value of her deferred income: (1) because there will be tax consequences that
need to be recognized; and (2) because the Trust does not have sufficient liquid assets to pay
Petitioner in a lump sum. Petitioner urges the Court to discount the debt because of the
"risk"that she may not be able to collect the full amount from the Trust. Id. The Court finds that
Petitioner's arguments have little merit.
^[17
As to the tax liability issue, at trial Respondent suggested that the parties were similarly
situated financially and that the Court could therefore treat both parties as being subject to a 33%
7

At trial Petitioner sought to distance herself from the statements in her application by
claiming that her son had prepared and signed the Ford Credit application. Whether that belated
assertion is true or not is irrelevant; the fact is that Petitioner acknowledged submitting the
application to Ford Credit. Thus, if someone else prepared and/or signed the application, the
reasonable inference is that it was done at her direction. Further, by submitting the application
Petitioner adopted the representations therein as her own. It is undisputed that Petitioner was the
one who received the benefit of the credit secured by that application, and that she used those
proceeds to purchase a vehicle which she used. Petitioner has also claimed that she applied to
Ford Credit in her capacity as trustee of the Trust, not on her own behalf. There is no indication
on the face of the application that would support this contention.
-5-

tax liability. Petitioner did not challenge that suggestion or offer an alternative. Accordingly, the
Court accepts Respondent's suggestion as a fair and appropriate way to calculate the tax liability
on Petitioner's uncollected earnings.
f 18 As to the "risk" of not collecting on the unpaid earnings, although Petitioner is technically
a co-trustee of the Trust (with her mother), the evidence before the Court strongly suggests that
Petitioner has exercised full control over the Trust's assets and has used the Trust structure in
whatever manner she deemed most beneficial to her personal interest. Indeed, according to
Petitioner's own testimony, during the same time she was deferring payments to herself from the
Truster her services, she was paying herself and her siblings $500 per month as gifts from the
Trust. The Court does not credit Petitioner's testimony in this regard. She has presented no
corroborative evidence to support her claim that during the relevant time period the Trust was so
illiquid that it could not pay her for her services. To be sure, Petitioner's exhibit 50, a letter
dated July 28, 2008, states that the Trust presently lacks enough "liquid" assets to retire the
admitted Trust's financial obligation to Petitioner. However, nothing in that letter addresses the
Trust's inability during the relevant period (1998-2005) to pay the amounts it owed. Indeed, it is
evident from the gifts paid out during that period (together with rents collected from Trust
properties) that there were liquid assets available to the Trust at the time. It is also clear from the
testimony at trial that the Trust presently owns a number of other assets that could be sold to
retire that obligation.8 Moreover, that is not the only option available. Because these parties
have considerable other assets to their name, there is always the option of offsetting the value
Respondent's share of imputed income from the Trust against other assets of the parties.
If 19 Respondent suggested that the Court also impute interest on Petitioner's undeclared wage
income at a "modest" rate of 5% per year.9 Although Respondent presented no evidence in
support of the interest rate he proposed, the Court can take judicial notice of the legal interest

8

The evidence before the Court was that in the year 2000, the Trust owned assets worth
approximately $3.2 million. Petitioner's trial testimony to the effect that she does not know the
worth of the Trust she controls is simply not credible.
9

At trial, Respondent's counsel made a somewhat different argument regarding wages to
be imputed to Petitioner. The numbers suggested by Respondent's counsel in argument include
$50,000 in a "forgiven loan," $15,084.00 in value of unaccounted "overtime pay", $10,000 in
estimated interest, and a $108,093.30 adjustment to the hourly salary. The Court concludes that
Respondent's counsel failed to lay proper foundation for how these numbers were derived.
Specifically, Respondent's counsel did not explain the time periods covered by his calculations
(i.e, beginning in 1995, 1998, or 2000), the basis for calculating interest, the basis for concluding
that Petitioner would be covered by federal overtime pay provisions vs. being salaried
"managemenf'personnel, etc. The Court concludes that it will simply rely on Petitioner's
representations to Ford Credit for computing years worked and monthly salary.
-6-

rates for the relevant period (1998-2005).10 The yearly-set federal post-judgment interest rate
during that period ranged from a low of 3.28% in 2004 to a high of 7.64% in 1998, and averaged
5.5% for the entire period. Therefore, the Court accepts Respondent's suggestion that a 5%
interest rate be used to approximate the interest income that would have resulted if Petitioner had
timely collected her wages from the Trust.
Valuation of the Marital Estate
Tf20
In this case the parties have used the date of separation to calculate other matters
involving division of assets and allocation of debt. For example, Petitioner calculated her
acknowledged earnings from the Trust only through May 10, 2005. Similarly, Respondent's
request that income be imputed to Petitioner only extended through May 10, 2005. Additionally,
at ^|22 of the Stipulation Agreement signed by the parties in October 2005 (the "Stipulation"), the
parties agreed to "bear sole liability for, and hold the other party harmless from , any debts or
liabilities incurred . . .[by them] since the[ir] separation in May, 2005, unless indicted [sic]
otherwise in this Stipulation."
1f2l
As part of the Stipulation the parties also agreed that any wages earned after the date of
separation would be their sole and separate property. Stipulation, at ^20. Notwithstanding that
agreement, Petitioner now argues that this provision does not apply to accruals of pension
benefits after that date. She, therefore, makes claim to an equitable share of Respondent's
pension benefits through the date the Divorce Decree enters. Petitioner has offered little by way
of support for her claim to post-separation pension benefits other than reliance on the general rule
that assets are valued as of the time of trial or entry of the Divorce Decree.
Premarital Property and Inheritance
*|22
The parties have stipulated that value of premarital real estate properties held by the
parties is essentially "a wash." Therefore, the parties did not present evidence at trial on this
issue. The Court finds that the parties have resolved between themselves the issue of the
premarital real estate.
^|23
As part of their 2005 Stipulation Respondent received $21,232.56 from the sale of his
mother's home, and $ 19,971.12 from the sale of land owned by his mother in New Mexico. The
parties further recognized that Respondent was entitled to those funds as his separate property,

10

Each year the United States Government and the Administrative Office of the Courts for
the State of Utah publishes the federal post-judgment interest rate for that year. For the relevant
period (1998-2005). Of course, even though these Under Utah Code §15-1-1(2), the statutory
pre-judgment is 10%.
-7-
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together with all interest accrued from those funds.11 Petitioner disputes and claims a halfinterest in $14,213.17 in cash from Respondent's mother's estate. The Court heard testimony at
trial regarding these funds and finds that those moneys came from Respondent's mother's
account, that no marital funds were placed in mother's account, and that the transfer of funds to
the parties' joint account was solely for purposes of distribution to Respondent's siblings as part
of settling the mother's estate^
Division of Marital Assets
Cash and Cash Equivalents
^[24 The parties have stipulated that they presently hold, in various accounts, a total of
$447,471.94 in marital assets. The money in these accounts should be equitably divided between
the parties after adjustments to reflect the awards and offsets discussed in these Findings of
Fact.12

Marital Residence

1

Although Respondent was awarded these inheritance amounts in 2005 under the terms
of the Stipulation, he has never received those funds because Petitioner's counsel "froze" the
accounts. It is not exactly clear to the Court why three years after the Stipulation these funds
have not been distributed to Respondent, but the Court finds that these previously-awarded funds
should be immediately released to Respondent. Respondent should also receive all the interest
accrued on the funds awarded to him by Stipulation but which have been detained by actions of
Petitioner's counsel.
12

As referenced supra, as part of their Stipulation the parties received a partial distribution
of marital assets in cash, negotiable instruments, and personalty, valued at approximately
$200,000 for each party. The distributions included the following:
Petitioner
Certificate of Deposit (CD) valued at $34,960
5-year term deposit valued at $45,168.57
1/2 share in CD valued at $221,265.42
1/2 share in a Cyprus CU account ($8,711.14 ea.)

Respondent
CD valued at $33,525.07
5-year term deposit valued at $45,168.57
1/2 share in CD valued at $221,265.42
1/2 share in a Cyprus CU account ($8,711.14 ea.)

The parties also stipulated that any difference in the actual dollar value of the CDs awarded to the
parties would be taken into account in the final settlement of the marital estate, and Respondent
would be entitled to an offset for the difference in the amount. Stipulation, at ^3.
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^[25
Respondent has requested that the Court impute a fair market rental value for the
residence in the amount of $1,300 per month, and that it award him one-half of that imputed
rental value as a marital asset. The Court finds no basis for doing so. In their Stipulation the
parties agreed that Petitioner would be awarded exclusive use and possession of the marital
residence during the pendency of the action. Although in their Stipulation Petitioner expressly
disclaimed any claim for spousal support and/or alimony during the pendency of this action, the
Court construes the provision granting Petitioner the right to use and possess the residence as a
form of negotiated "in-kind" spousal support. The Court also finds no merit to Respondent's
alternative suggestion that the Court consider the expenditures he incurred in securing separate
housing for during the pendency of the action. Because of the protective order that issued as a
result of the DV incident in May 2005, Respondent was not allowed to remain in the residence.
That protective order remains in place and, as a result, whether or not these parties were
divorcing, Respondent would have incurred a separate housing expense.
^}26 At Petitioner's request, the marital residence was appraised in June, 2008, and valued at
$ 186,000. Petitioner has asked that the marital residence be awarded to her with credit to
Respondent for his interest in the residence. However, Petitioner argues that the Court should
adjust downward the residence's value to account for a "mold problem" in the residence and the
cost of remedying the alleged problem.
^[27
The appraiser, Mr. Mulcock, testified that he was asked to consider the cost to remedy the
mold problem after he rendered his appraisal. Mr. Mulcock testified that he would amend his
appraisal downward by $5,000.00 to account for that problem. The Court accepts Mr. Mulcock's
testimony and finds that the residence should be valued at $181,000.00. The Court finds this is a
marital asset and Respondent is entitled to his equitable share of that value.
Personalty
Vehicles and Boat
^[28
Based on the Stipulation the parties divided between themselves various items of
personalty including a SeaRay boat, which was awarded to Petitioner and valued at $14,900.
Respondent was awarded two older Ford trucks (one brown, one red) and a red truck topper. The
parties agreed that value on those vehicles would be assessed according to Kelly Blue Book value
as of May 2005. Stipulation at 1fijl0,l 1. Respondent was also awarded the parties' 1992
Northland Camper, at an assessed value of $2,000.00, with the proviso that "Petitioner [would
be] entitled to a $2,000.00 offset in the final division of the marital estate." Id., at ^[11. The
parties also stipulated that the difference between the value of the boat and the value of the two
trucks and the topper would be taken into account in the final division of the marital estate. Id.,

atlfH.
^[29
Respondent presented evidence at trial that the Kelly Blue Book "private party" value for
the Ford trucks was $3,150 for the Brown Ford truck and $4,350 for the Red Ford truck.
-9-

Petitioner did not contest those figures and the Court accepts them as fair representation of the
value of those vehicles. Neither side presented evidence on the value of the red "topper" for one
of the trucks, so the Court assumes no additional value attributable to it.
f30
After subtracting the value of the two Ford trucks awarded to Respondent in October
2005, from the $14,900 value of the SeaRay boat awarded to Petitioner at that time, the Court
finds that there is a difference of $7,400 in favor of Respondent. Pursuant to ^[11 of the
Stipulation, Petitioner is entitled to a $2,000 offset because of the Northland Camper awarded to
Respondent. After subtracting Petitioner's offset, the Court finds that Respondent is entitled to a
net credit of $5,400 for these items of previously-distributed personalty.
1f31
Respondent has asked the Court to include within the marital estate the value of two
vehicles (a 2003 Ford Taurus and a 2004 Ford F-150 truck) purchased with funds from the Trust.
In support of his position Respondent argues that these vehicles were "additional compensation"
for Petitioner's services to the Trust and were intended to be marital property. The evidence at
trial established that the money to purchase these vehicles came from the Trust, but that the
vehicles were initially registered in Petitioner's name. Thereafter, on or about November 23,
2005, Petitioner requested that the Division of Motor Vehicles issue a "corrected" Utah
certificate of title for the two vehicles to reflect ownership by Petitioner as trustee of the Trust.
The vehicles were insured under the parties' homeowner's policy, but Petitioner testified
(without challenge by Respondent) that the cost of the insurance was paid by the Trust.
Tf32
Based on the evidence presented the Court finds that while the parties benefitted from the
use of these vehicles for a period of time, the 2003 Taurus and the 2004 Ford F-150 should
properly be considered as part of the Trust estate which paid to purchase and insure them.
Dogs
f33
The parties own four dogs, each valued at approximately $800. Petitioner has retained
possession of the dogs. Therefore, it is fair and appropriate that Respondent receive an offsetting
credit in the amount of $3,200.
Coin Collection and Silver Granules
P4
The parties acknowledge that Respondent had a coin collection that predated their
marriage. There is also agreement that in July 2003, Respondent paid Petitioner's mother
approximately $8,840 for some coins. That payment was made with a check from an account
bearing the names of both parties. Petitioner has alleged that Respondent took the coin collection
with him when the parties separated and has since hidden or otherwise disposed of the coins in
order to make them unavailable to her. Respondent denies Petitioner's claim.
f35
At trial Respondent was asked directly where the coins were located. Because of
Respondent's concern that the items would "disappear" if he disclosed their location in open
-10-
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court, arrangements were made to have a representative of the Taylorsville Police Department
search the location identified by Respondent. The location turned out to be at the residence that
has been occupied by Petitioner since the May 2005 incident. The police officer was
accompanied by the parties' attorneys. The police officer who conducted the search reported to
the Court that none of the items sought had been found.
^[36
Although the Court could reasonably infer from what transpired at trial that Respondent is
not in possession of these items, the Court has insufficient evidence to render a specific Finding
on this issue. In short, the Court cannot find that one or the other of the parties is more likely
than not to have these items within his/her possession. Accordingly the Court declines to credit
the value of these items against either of the parties' share of the marital estate. However, if at a
later date there is evidence presented that one of the parties indeed has maintained control or
disposed of these items, it would be appropriate for the aggrieved party to seek sanctions under
an Order to Show Cause.
Tf37
In the Stipulation Respondent acknowledged that "he has sole control" over several
packets of silver ore (the "granules"). Stipulation, at ^J16. Petitioner alleged that this ore is the
property of Petitioner's mother; Respondent claimed it had been a gift to him from Petitioner's
mother after it was determined that the ore did not contain gold. Petitioner bears the burden of
proof and, presumably, she could have had her mother testify about this issue. The fact that she
chose not to present the most persuasive and direct evidence available (her mother's testimony),
suggests to the Court that her mother's testimony would not have supported her contention.
Given that the Court has already determined that Petitioner's uncorroborated testimony is not
credible, the benefit of the doubt goes to Respondent.
Home Furnishings
TJ38 Respondent alleges that Petitioner retained most of the home furnishings after he was
escorted out of the home on May 2005. He requests that the Court award him a gun cabinet and
pool table, both of which are presently in Petitioner's possession, and another $2,000 to balance
out the value of the furnishings retained by Petitioner. Petitioner did not object to or comment on
this request by Respondent. The Court therefore awards the requested items and the $2,000
offset to Respondent.13
Operating Engineers Pension Account and IRAs
^|39

Petitioner maintains that the "marital estate commenced to be accumulated beginning
13

At the time the Court orally announced its Findings to the parties and counsel, on
Petitioner's behalf her counsel requested that Respondent be required to arrange for a bonded and
insured mover to pick up and transport the pool table and gun cabinet from Petitioner's
residence. The Court finds that this is a reasonable request and will require Respondent to make
those arrangements.
-11-
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May 1982." Petitioner's Trial Brief, at 1-2. Petitioner asks to be awarded one half of
Respondent's retirement pension account with the Operating Engineers Trust Fund for the period
of May 1982 through the date the Divorce Decree enters. Respondent argues that the moneys
accumulated in his pension account premaritally, i.e., before May 1984, should be deemed his
separate property, and that the Court should divide the marital estate as of the date of separation.
The Court disagrees with Petitioner's argument and finds that Respondent's pension accruals
prior to the date of marriage should be considered his separate pre-marital property. The Court
also finds that the provisions in the parties' Stipulation regarding the separation of their financial
interests (wages, debts, etc) applies to Respondent's pension account. Petitioner's claim to an
equitable share of Respondent's pension benefits also terminates as of May 10, 2005.
f40
The value of an IRAs established premaritally by the parties should be considered
separate property. To the extent, if at all, that contributions were made to pre-existing or newly
established IRAs between the parties' marriage and separation, those amounts should be
considered marital assets and equitably divided between the parties.
Miscellaneous Matters
Taxes Paid on Interest
Tf41
During tax years 2005 and 2006 Respondent declared and paid taxes on the funds he
withdrew from the parties' joint accounts. Additional interest has accumulated for tax years
2007 and 2008, although it is not clear whether Respondent actually paid taxes on the 2007
interest, and the 2008 tax year has not yet closed. Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner
should receive one-half of the interest that has accrued on these funds between 2005 and now,
but wants Petitioner to pay one half of the taxes he has paid on the accrued interest. The Court
finds that Respondent acted intentionally and wrongfully in emptying out the marital accounts
immediately upon the parties' separation, and in transferring those funds to accounts solely
within his control. Although Respondent has testified-without challenge by Petitioner-that he
has returned to the marital estate $20,908.27 of what he had previously withdrawn, the Court
finds that it would be inequitable to allow these actions by Respondent to go unsanctioned.
Thus, while the Court agrees that Petitioner is entitled to one-half of the interest that has accrued
on the marital funds under Respondent's control, the Court finds it is fair and appropriate that
Respondent alone bear the tax consequences of the marital funds he has had under his control.
Cash value of Petitioner's Life Insurance
^[42 The parties have stipulated that Petitioner's life insurance has a cash value of $13,045.00
and that it is a marital asset. Respondent should be awarded one half of that cash value.

Respondent's Payments on Behalf of Petitioner and/or Her Son
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TJ43 Petitioner has not contested Respondent's request that he be given credit for the moneys
he loaned Petitioner's son. Petitioner also acknowledges that Respondent made various
payments on her behalf and that he should receive an offset for those payments prior to dividing
the marital estate.
Recoupment for Respondent's Personalty Sold by Petitioner
^}44 Petitioner has admitted selling ammunition and ammo reloading equipment belonging to
Respondent for "$36 and a dinner." Respondent has estimated that it will cost $2,500 to replace
all the equipment which he maintains Petitioner sold.14 However, Respondent has provided no
support for his cost estimate. For example, there was no indication that Respondent's estimate
accounts for depreciation due to age of the equipment, "wear and tear," and whether some of it
may have become obsolete technology in the interim period. The Court has directed
Respondent's counsel to provide documentation supporting his client's claim. The Court finds
that in disposing of Respondent's equipment for a "fire sale" price Petitioner acted wrongfully,
and therefore she should be held liable for reimbursing Respondent for any documented value
that Respondent is able to provide in support of his estimated replacement cost.
Azite Mine Investment (aka Custom Milling and Grinding)
^[45
Per the terms of the parties' Stipulation, they will each be allocated a 50% interest in that
investment, subject to each bearing one half the costs, including attorneys fees, associated with
the venture.
Protective Order
^[46
Petitioner desires to have the protective order issued in 2005 made permanent;
Respondent wants to have it lifted so that he may recover certain weapons that have been held in
police custody since the May 2005 incident. Respondent argues that the parties have had no
direct dealings with each other since that time and there is no reason to maintain the order.
Based on the history of these parties the Court is persuaded that it is appropriate to maintain
some form of decorum order to govern the parties' direct and indirect dealings with each other.
However, the Court has been presented with no persuasive argument for why the existing and
one-sided protective order should be maintained in its present form. The Court finds that it is
fair and appropriate that the existing protective order terminate and be replaced with a mutual
restraining order that prohibits both parties from engaging in harassing behavior or referencing
the other-directly or indirectly—in a demeaning or derogatory manner
14

Respondent claims that Petitioner also disposed of his binoculars and of some camping
equipment. Petitioner denies the claim. Because of Petitioner's general lack of credibility and
the fact that, for the most part, Petitioner has maintained control over all personalty at the
residence since Respondent was removed in May 2005, the Court is inclined to resolve these
disputed issues in favor of Respondent.
-13-

Attorney's Fee Requests
^[47 Both parties have asked the Court to award attorney's fees in this action. As represented
in the affidavit for fees and expenses submitted by Petitioner's counsel, Petitioner has incurred a
total of $140,499.59 in fees including $122,294.50 in attorney's fees, $11,093.25 in accounting
services, and lesser amounts in other services. The affidavit filed by Respondent's counsel
reflects $137,495.05 in fees and services, of which $130,130.50 is for attorney's fees. At the
time the Commissioner certified this matter for trial he commented that "each party has caused
the other party to incur some unnecessary fees." The Commissioner noted, however, that "there
may be a difference in extent and this may be a reason for some modest adjustment by way of
attorney's fees." Minutes for Pretrial Conference, November 28, 2007.
f48
In reviewing the history of this case as reflected in the Court's file and case docket, of
which the Court takes judicial notice, it is apparent that in this highly contested case the parties
have brought number of motions including at least one set of cross motions to compel discovery.
See, e.g., Respondent's Motion and Memorandum to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions and to
Extend Discovery, filed 5-26-06; Petitioner's Motion to Compel, filed 6-16-06. The matters were
heard by the Commissioner on 6-21-08 and Respondent prevailed on that motion. The issue of
attorney's fees was reserved for later determination. Petitioner objected to the Commissioner's
recommendation, prompting additional briefing to this Court. The Court affirmed the
Commissioner's recommendation.
Tf49
Thereafter, on 7-6-06, Petitioner brought motions to quash Subpoenas deuces Tecum and
for a Protective Order, again seeking to shield herself from legitimate discovery by Respondent.
Respondent had to incur fees opposing those motions. At a hearing on 7-25-06, the
Commissioner denied both of the Petitioner's motions. Petitioner again objected to the
Commissioner's recommendation, requiring further briefing in response by Respondent's
counsel. After careful review, this Court again affirmed the Commissioner's Recommendation
by Minute Entry Ruling on 10-24-06.
^[50 An Order to Show Cause for failure to return personal property to Respondent (including
his mother's personal papers) was certified against Petitioner on 11-06-06, with attorney's fees
issues reserved for trial. At the same hearing the Commissioner ordered that a third party
accompany the parties in a "walk through" of the residence to inspect for documents and other
property of Respondent or his mother's could be found there. At trial, Respondent continued to
assert that some items of his personal property had still not been produced, but there was no
evidence presented specifically regarding his mother's personal papers. Therefore the Court
infers that the parties' "walk-through" resolved this issue.
Tf51
On or about 2-2-07, Respondent filed a number of motions and supporting memoranda
seeking to quash subpoenas deuces tecum issued by Petitioner and directed to third parties. Later
that same month and pursuant to an agreement with Petitioner, Respondent withdrew his various
motions, but not before Petitioner had to respond to at least some of those motions.
-14-

^|52
Yet another motion to compel was filed on or about 7-30-07, this time by Petitioner, who
was seeking Respondent's financial records. Petitioner alleged she needed the discovery to
support her renewed claim for alimony. At a hearing held 8-20-07, the Commissioner
determined and recommended that Petitioner's motion to compel be denied because Petitioner
had used her waiver of alimony as a shield in the discovery process.
^[53
Petitioner objected to the Commissioner's Recommendation. On 9-11-07, after
reviewing the parties' briefing on that issue, the Court affirmed the Commissioner's
Recommendation and overruled Petitioner's objection. The Court made it clear in its ruling that
"[petitioner's] opportunity to conduct further discovery regarding Respondent's finances for
purposes of alimony has now closed." Minute Entry of 9-11-07.
<[|54 On 9-28-07, Petitioner then sought to have the Trust she controls as co- trustee intervene
in the case. Again, briefing by Respondent was necessary to oppose that motion. The
Commissioner recommended that the motion to intervene be denied, and reserved for later
determination Respondent's request for attorney's fees incurred by him in opposing the motion to
intervene.15 This Court agreed with and affirmed the Commissioner's Recommendation.16
^[55
In making their respective requests for attorney's fees, neither party has specified the
bases for their requested fees. Fees could be sought under Utah Code §30-3-3(1) or (2), or under
Utah R. Civ. P. 37 as a discovery sanction, and under the Court's contempt powers as a contempt
sanction.
Tf56
At trial neither party expressly addressed his or her need for assistance with attorney's
fees, nor the other party's financial ability to assist with those fees. Both counsel's affidavits
recite that they believe the fees charged are reasonable for the local market and necessarily
incurred in prosecuting their client's cases.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
^J57

Jurisdictional requirements for entering a Divorce Decree are met in this case

15

At that same hearing the Commissioner recommended that Respondent's motion to
quash a subpoena deuces tecum issued to Utah Community Credit Union be denied. He also
denied Petitioner's request for attorney's fees on the motion to quash.
16

The Court notes this was the second attempt to intervene in this case by individuals or
entities related to Petitioner. The first time was in September 2006 when Helen Powell
(Petitioner's mother and co-trustee of the Trust) sought to intervene in the case. That request was
denied by the Commissioner. The Commissioner's Recommendation of denial was affirmed by
this Court by Minute Entry in October 2006.
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^[58

Petitioner repeatedly and validly waived her claim to alimony.

^[59 A Divorce Decree should enter in this case on the ground of "irreconcilable differences"
as pled in the Complaint.
^[60
For the reasons given in the Findings of Fact, there should be income imputed to
Petitioner from the Trust in the amount of $312,740. Interest on this amount should be
calculated at an annual rate of 5% (simple interest). Respondent is entitled to his equitable share
of that amount as reflected in offsets and credits for the benefit of Respondent, to be taken
against the parties' other assets.
%6l The Respondent should take his mother's inheritance (including moneys from her bank
account) free and clear of claims by Petitioner. Those funds are awarded to Respondent as his
separate property, together with all interest accrued.
1f62
The general rule is that the marital estate is valued as of the time of the divorce decree or
trial. However, the Court has discretion to select a different date for valuing the estate if justice
so requires. Because these parties have generally ordered their financial arrangements vis a vis
the other as of the date of separation, the Court concludes that it is fair and appropriate to value
the marital property as of that date. The only exception to this is the valuation of the marital
residence, which Petitioner had appraised as of June 2008, and which Respondent accepted and
adopted as an appropriate valuation date.
^[63
The Court values the marital residence at $181,000 and the Divorce Decree will include
an award to Respondent for one half that value.
f 64
Based on the Findings herein, the Divorce Decree will implement the various offsets
noted.
TJ65 The 2003 Taurus and the 2004 Ford F-150 are the property of the Trust, and not marital
property.
f66
Respondent's holds a pre-marital interest in the Operating Engineers Pension account.
The contributions to that account from the time the parties married until they separated are
marital property. Contributions to that account after the parties' separation are Respondent's sole
and separate property.
f67
It is appropriate that a mutual restraining order enter as part of the Divorce Decree; the
existing protective order will terminate.
^[68 Neither party has made the required showing of need and of the other party's ability to
pay in support of their respective requests for attorneys fees under Utah Code §30-3-3 and Utah
R. Civ. P. 102. However, Respondent has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
-16-
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he had to bring, and prevailed in, Orders to Show Cause because of Petitioner's failure to comply
with discovery. The Commissioner had reserved the issue of attorneys fees for those OSCs and
the Court concludes that having prevailed substantively in those proceedings, it is appropriate
that Respondent recover the reasonable attorneys fees incurred in bringing and defending those
proceedings. See supra Findings, 1148, 50 Additionally, Respondent had to defend a motion to
compel brought by Petitioner on or about 7-30-07. The Court awards Respondent his reasonable
attorneys fees in connection with defending against that motion pursuant to its authority under
Utah R. Civ. P. 37. Findings at 1152-53.
169
The Court also awards attorneys fees to Respondent for defending the second motion to
intervene in this case. Findings at ^54.
170
The Court awards any attorneys fees that Respondent may have incurred in his efforts to
secure the inheritance funds awarded to him as part of the October 2005 Stipulation but which
have been "frozen" by, or on behalf of, Petitioner. See note 11, supra
171
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 37, the Court awards to Petitioner her attorney's fees incurred in
connection with defending against Respondent's motions to quash various subpoenas deuces
tecum brought on or about February 2007. Findings, at *|51.
172

Except as otherwise provided herein, no other attorneys fees are to be awarded.

173
The attorney's fee affidavits that have been submitted do not specify the amounts spent to
address the issues for which attorneys fees have been specifically authorized. Counsel will need
to submit those affidavits for the Court's review to establish the reasonableness of the attorneys
fees expended as noted herein at ^ 68 through 71 inclusive.
ORDER
174
Respondent's counsel is directed promptly to prepare and file a Decree of Divorce that
conforms with these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
175
Counsel are directed to provide to the Court within ten (10) days of these Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, specific affidavits focused only on the items addressed at H 68 through
71 inclusive.
Entered this 10th day of October, 2008. By the Court:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RITA Y. RICHINS,
Petitioner,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.

Civil No.: 054902600

JAMES E. RICHINS,

Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG
Commissioner:

Respondent.

In the above-captioned matter, a bench trial was held in this case on August 4th, and
August 5th, 2008. Petitioner was present and represented by her counsel, Mary Paxman McGee.
Respondent was present and represented by his counsel, Tom D Branch. The Court heard
testimony and received exhibits offered by both parties, and took the matter under advisement.
After review of the testimony and exhibits the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order dated October 15, 2008. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
are incorporated herein together with the Minute Entry clarifying said Findings dated March 6,
2009, and based thereon, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, now decrees the
following:
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
THAT:

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND GROUNDS
1.

Petitioner and Respondent are actual and bona fide residents' of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah, and have been so for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the
commencement of this action.
2.

Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, having been married in Salt

Lake County on May 26, 1984, in the State of Utah. The parties separated on May 10, 2005.
3.

During the course of the marriage, there have arisen differences in the party's

lifestyles, beliefs and attitudes toward each other such that they have been unable to reconcile
those beliefs and attitudes so as to remain living together as husband and wife. As a result of the
foregoing irreconcilable differences, the marriage is irretrievably broken, making it impossible
for the marriage to continue and the Court grants Petitioner a Decree of Divorce dissolving the
bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the parties, the same to become final upon
entry, upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO ALIMONY
4.

The Court ruled prior to trial on more than one occasion that Petitioner had

repeatedly and validly waived her alimony claim. Nevertheless, at trial, Petitioner sought to
again proffer grounds in support of a renewed claim for alimony. Petitioner has provided no
facts that would justify a change to the Court's prior rulings, which are incorporated herein, and
as set forth in the Court's Findings. No material facts have changed since the last time the Court
addressed this issue, therefore, Petitioner's claim for alimony has been waived, and there are not
2

sufficient facts presented to justify any claim for same, and therefore no alimony is awarded.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSESTS
5.

The parties stipulated to cash and cash equivalent amounts at the time of

trial of $447,471.94 held in various accounts in their respective names as itemized below:
ACCOUNTS IN PETITIONER'S NAME
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
Salt Lake Credit Union Checking
Salt Lake Credit Union Shares
Salt Lake Credit Union Money Mrkt
Salt Lake Credit Union CD
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA
Operating Engineers CU Checking
Operating Engineers CU Savings
Operating Engineers CU IRA

ACCOUNT #
53240
53240
53240
53240
53240
53240
53240
226042
226042
226042

BALANCE AT TRIAL
428.06
26.45
569.31
1,217.62
3,641.45
3,509.01
3,448.27
501.12
5.77
26.754.81
40,101.87

ACCOUNTS IN RESPONDENT'S NAME
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
America First
Savings
America First
Certificate
State Farm Bank
Savings
State Farm Bank
IRA
State Farm Bank
IRA
State Farm Bank
IRA
Cyprus Credit Union Reg. Shares
Cyprus Credit Union Money Market
Cyprus Credit Union Certificate
Cyprus Credit Union Certificate
Mountain America CU Savings
Mountain America CU Money Mrkt
Mountain America CU Certificate
Operating Engineers CU Money Mrk
Operating Engineers CU Checking
Operating Engineers CU IRA
Operating Engineers CU Certificate
Salt Lake Credit Union Shares
Salt Lake Credit Union Money Mrkt
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA

ACCOUNT #
883606-6
883606-6
1009810290
1009849452
1009903039
1009849449
xxxxxl36
xxxxxl36
16957
17070
xxxxxl990
xxxxxl990
xxxxxl990
227578
227578
227578
227578
50008
50008
50008

BALANCE AT TRIAL
27.01
81,620.17
54,209.38
64,002.61
75,501.75
4,027.18
49.07
.55
43,950.24
25,412.94
25.00
5,430.99
7,892.46
62.40
220.64
8,963.55
26,819.41
31.33

9.27
9,114.12
407,370.07 Respondent's Total
40,101.87 Petitioner's Total
447,471.94 TOTAL
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6.

However, the Court concludes pursuant to its Findings that it is fair and

appropriate to value the marital estate as of the date of separation, May 10, 2005. Therefore, the
combined cash and cash equivalent of the accounts at separation are as itemized below:
ACCOUNTS IN PETITIONER'S NAME AS OF DATE OF SEPARATION:
ACCOUNT #
BALANCE AT MAY 10, 2005
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
1,653.21
53240
Salt Lake Credit Union Checking
25.78
53240
Salt Lake Credit Union Shares
4,049.02
53240
Salt Lake Credit Union Money Mrkt
53240
1,063.46
Salt Lake Credit Union CD
3,182.03
53240 #2785
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA
3,094.13
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA
53240 #3958
3,014.67
53240 #5084
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA
226042
3,481.71
Operating Engineers CU Checking
Operating Engineers CU Savings
226042
2,863.10
Operating Engineers CU IRA
226042
26,010.91
$ 48,438.02 Petitioner's total
ACCOUNTS IN RESPONDENT'S NAME AS OF DATE OF SEPARATION:
ACCOUNT#
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION
America First
Savings
883606-6
America First
Certificate
883606-6
Vanguard
IRA
Vanguard
IRA, Roth
Cyprus Credit Union Reg. Shares
xxxxxl36
16957
Cyprus Credit Union Certificate
Cyprus Credit Union
Mountain America CU Savings
xxxxxl990
Mountain America CU Money Mrkt
xxxxxl990
Mountain America CU Certificate
xxxxxl990
Mountain America CU
Operating Engineers CU
227578
Operating Engineers CU
227578
Operating Engineers CU
Operating Engineers CU
Operating Engineers CU
Operating Engineers CU
Operating Engineers CU
227578
Operating Engineers CU IRA
227578
Operating Engineers CU IRA, Roth
Salt Lake Credit Union Shares
50008
Salt Lake Credit Union Money Mrkt
50008
Salt Lake Credit Union IRA ROTH
50008
$
$
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BALANCE AT MAY 10. 2005
780.97
71,013.16
56,224.13
3,537.75
6,166.51
38,138.94
4,630.42
25.00
6,960.34
3,005.66
5,043.26
1,344.60
2,004.84
37,941.56
43,989.59
24,263.82
5,242.08
9,611.82
66,378.37
8,653.86
30.46
2,654.15
8.078.21
405.719.50 Respondent's total

454,157.52 TOTAL OF ACCOUNTS

7.

The parties entered into a Stipulation concerning the partial distribution of marital

assets on or about October 14, 2005. The terms of the stipulation were reduced to writing and
entered as a Temporary Order by this Court on October 27, 2005. Each party received
approximately $200,000 from that division. The Court incorporates that Order herein.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO PETITIONER'S WAGES FROM
POWELL FAMILY TRUST
8.

Petitioner was employed by the Trust for no less than 82.3 months at a gross

monthly wage of $3,800 per month, for a total gross imputed earnings of $312,740. The Court
imputes income to Petitioner for the time period set forth in the Findings of $312,740 together
with interest at 5% per annum, and deducts taxes at 33% per annum. The amount awarded to
Respondent is one half of Petitioner's net income from the trust to be paid directly or as an offset
from the equitable division of the parties' cash equivalents or assets. Respondent's one-half share
is $134,364.75. (See accounting of "Petitioner's Wages from Trust", Exhibit "A".)
PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CASH VALUE OF LIFE INSURANCE
9.

Petitioner has a Life insurance policy with a cash value of $13,045 and

Respondent is entitled to one-half of the value, or $6,522.50, to be paid directly or as an offset
from the equitable division of the parties' cash equivalents or assets.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE MARITAL HOME
10.

The martial home is valued at $ 181,000 and Respondent shall be entitled to one

half of the value of the home in the amount of $90,500.00 to be paid directly or as offset from the
equitable division of the parties1 cash and cash equivalents or other assets.

5

PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAXES PAID ON INTEREST
11.

Respondent shall be solely liable for all taxes he paid from interest on the funds

he withdrew from the parties' joint accounts for the tax years 2005 through 2008.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO CD FUNDS PREVIOUSLY DIVIDED
12.

Based on the October 2005 Order, two (2) certificates of deposit were divided.

The Petitioner received a CD, valued at $34,960 and Respondent received a CD valued at
$33,525.07. The Respondent is awarded the difference between the two (2) certificates of
deposits in the amount of $1,434.93, to be paid directly or offset from the equitable division of
the parties1 cash and cash equivalents or other assets.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO CASH ACCOUNTS, CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSITS,
VEHICLES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
13.

The Respondent is entitled to a net credit of $5,400, which represents the

difference in the values of the vehicles of previously-distributed property, and is to be paid
directly or offset from the equitable division of the partiesf cash and cash equivalents or other
assets.
14.

The additional items of personal property not already in Respondent's possession

that shall be granted to the Respondent shall be the gun cabinet and the pool table along with an
additional $2,000 to balance out the value of the furnishings retained by Petitioner. $2,000 shall
be paid directly or offset from the equitable division of the parties' cash and cash equivalents or
other assets. Because of the cost and inconvenience to move the gun cabinet and pool table, the
Respondent voluntarily forgives his right to said items and they are hereby awarded to Petitioner.
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15.

Respondent shall also be awarded an amount equal to the estimated value of the

personal belongings Petitioner sold or otherwise disposed of by Petitioner. Respondent has
supplied a current estimate to replace the stated items in the amount of $1,453.70 but the Court
feels the submission does not make any adjustment to account for age and condition of the terms,
nor improvements in technology. To compensate for those considerations, the Court award
judgment in favor of Respondent in the amount of $1,200.00 and that amount is awarded to
Respondent and is to be paid directly or offset from the equitable division of the parties' cash and
cash equivalents or other assets.
16.

The Respondent shall be granted as non-marital property any and all granules or

packets of silver ore.
17.

Both parties shall be allocated a 50% interest in the investment of the Azite

Mine (aka Custom Milling and Grinding) and both parties' shall share one-half of the costs,
including attorneys fees, associated with the venture.
18.

The Respondent is awarded the amount of $3,200 for the value of the parties'

dogs to be paid directly or offset from the equitable division of the parties' cash and cash
equivalents or other assets.
19.

The Respondent is awarded $3,600 as an offset to the amount of monies

"loaned" to Petitioner's son, Erin Kowal, to be paid directly or offset from the equitable division
of the parties' cash and cash equivalents or other assets.
20.

The Respondent is awarded as non-marital funds the amount of $55,416.85,

which represents the total amount of Respondent's inheritance fiinds held at Cyprus Credit Union

7

that were "frozen" by Petitioner's counsel, and previously ordered to be released, together with
interest accrued on the funds in the amount of $349.14.
21.

Petitioner shall within 30 days notify all financial institutions to release all

funds held in Respondent's name and social security number as listed herein:
Salt Lake City Credit Union
Operating Engineers Credit Union
America First Credit Union
Mountain America Credit Union
State Farm Bank
Failure on the part of Petitioner to comply with this Order shall subject her to the full panoply of
Court Sanctions, including contempt.
22.

After separation Respondent paid Petitioner's personal bills in the amount of

$7,737.00 from Respondent's post separation wages (personal non-marital funds), therefore
Respondent is awarded twice that amount, or $15,474.00, to be paid directly or offset from the
equitable division of the parties' cash and cash equivalents or other assets.
PROTECTIVE ORDER DISMISSAL
23.

The Court hereby immediately terminates, dismisses and dissolves the

Protective Order against Respondent and Orders that he receive all his guns and other property
being held by the Bureau of Crimes Investigation in Taylorsville. This Decree is an Order to
release said property to Respondent immediately. Respondent is awarded all personal property
currently in his possession, his guns and all other property set forth in this Decree.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO DEBTS, OBLIGATIONS AND LIABILITIES

8

24.

Pursuant to U.C.A. § 15-4-6.5 the parties shall provide to their appropriate

creditors notice pursuant to said statute by service of a copy of the Decree of Divorce that the
parties are divorced and further advise said creditors of their separate and current address to take
advantage of said statute that no report of the debtor's repayment practices or credit history may
be made regarding the joint obligation after the creditors have notice of the Court's order unless
the creditor has made a demand on the debtor for payment because of failure to make payments
by the other debtor who is ordered by the Court to make the payments. The parties shall inform
any creditors (of a joint obligation) of the allocation of responsibility for payment herein and to
keep any such creditors informed of their current addresses for purposes of notification.

PROVISIONS RELATING TO RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS
25.

The Court finds that Respondent's pension accruals prior to the date of the

parties' marriage shall be his separate pre-marital property. The Court orders that the pension
account be divided as of the date of separation, May 10, 2005. Petitioner shall have claim to a
spouses share of Respondent's pension benefits from the date of their marriage (May 26, 1984)
to the date of separation (May 10, 2005). Contributions and interest accumulations to that
account before marriage and after the parties' separation are Respondent's sole and separate
property. The parties are to cooperate fully in drafting a Qualified Domestic Relation's Order
(QDRO) consistent with this Decree, and Petitioner is responsible to complete the QDRO with
mutual agreement of the parties.
INTEREST ON FUNDS AND IRA ACCOUNTS
26.

The value of any IRA's established premarital by the parties shall be

considered separate property. (The Respondent accrued pre-marital an IRA that with interest to

9

date of separation amounts to $23,891, See Accounting of Interest of IRA, Exhibit "B") To the
extent, if at all, that new contributions were made to pre-existing or newly established IRA's
between the parties' marriage and separation, those amounts shall be considered marital assets
and equitably divided between the parties.
PROVISIONS FOR AWARDS OF THE MARITAL ACCOUNTS
27.

Some of the cash accounts held by the parties as itemized in paragraph 6 of

this Decree, are traditional IRA pre-tax accounts. The court finds that a tax should be applied to
these amounts of 33% to properly allow for the present value of said accounts as follows:

Total of ERA accounts for Petitioner:
Amount of tax paid on IRA's @ 33%

35,301.74
-11,649.57
$23,652.17

Total of ERA accounts for Respondent 122,602.50
Less pre-marital ERA
-23,891.12
98,711.38
Amount of tax paid on ERA's @ 33% -32,574.75
$ 66,136.63
28.

Based on the awards set forth herein, the Court approves the below as a summary

of the division of assets:
PETITIONER

RESPONDENT

48,438.02 (cash at separation)

405,719.50 (cash at separation)

268,729.51 Rita's income from Trust (see exhibit A)
13,045.00 Life Insurance value

< 55,416.85> see paragraph 20 of Decree
<349.14> see paragraph 20 of Decree
<23,891.12> see paragraph 26 ofDecree

181,000.00 marital home

CD's division
Vehicle division
Rita's bills paid by Jim
Personal Property
10

<1,434.93> see paragraph 12 ofDecree
<5,400.00> see paragraph 13 ofDecree
<15,470.00> see paragraph 22 ofDecree
<2,000.00> see paragraph 14 ofDecree

Jim's personal property sold <15200.00> see paragraph 15 of Decree
Dogs
<3,200.0O> see paragraph 18 of Decree
Loan to son
<3,600.0O> see paragraph 19 of Decree
$511,212.52

$ 293,757.46

-11,649.57 for 33% tax on IRA's (see paragraph 27 of decree) -32,574.75 for 33% tax on IRA's
499,562.95
261,182.71

29.

The total of the parties' estate and accounts is $760,745.66. When divided by

one-half it equals $380,372.83 which is the amount awarded to each party. Once the amounts
currently under the control of each party are considered, the Petitioner owes the Respondent
$119,190.12 before any award of attorney fees.
30.

In order to compensate the Respondent for the amount due him as set forth in

the preceding paragraph and the amount of attorney fees awarded him in paragraph 32 hereafter,
the Petitioner is ordered to take immediate actions to liquidate or transfer any and all assets she
has or that are awarded to her herein to pay Respondent. Petitioner is ordered to pay Respondent
the full amounts awarded to him in this Decree within 15 days of its entry, and if she is unable to
do so then a judgment shall automatically enter for any balance not paid on that date, together
with Judgment and interest per law.
PROVISIONS RELATING TO RESTRAINT
31.

Both the Respondent and the Petitioner are mutually restrained from engaging

in harassing behavior towards the other, including treatment of the other in a demeaning or
derogatory manner, directly or indirectly. Both parties are mutually restrained from contacting
either party at their place of residence, employment or any other location and by any
communication device. Both parties are restrained from initiating or participating in any
communication or actions that would cause harm or threaten to harm to the other party.
11

ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
32.

The Court awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to paragraphs 68 through

71 of the Findings and pursuant to the Minute Entry dated March 6, 2009. The Respondent's
counsel has prepared and filed a more detailed Affidavit for Attorney Fees and Costs as directed
by the court. Respondent is awarded the amount of $ 45,954.00, to be added to the amount of
debt set forth in paragraph 29 herein. This award of fees is given under Utah Code Sec. 30-3-3
(1) or (2), or under Utah R. Civ. P. 37 as a discovery sanction, and under the Court's contempt
powers as a contempt sanction.
OTHER
33.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other party without cost,

any documents necessary to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the
Court.
SEPARATE PROPERTY
34.

Unless otherwise provided herein, all property and money received or retained

by each party pursuant not addressed in this Decree of Divorce shall be the separate property of
such party, free and clear of any right, interest or claim of the other party, and each party shall
hereafter own, have and enjoy, independently of any claim or right of the other party, all items of
real and personal property now or hereafter belonging to her or him, and each party shall have
the right to deal with or dispose of her or his separate property, both real and personal, fully and
effectively, in all respects and for all purposes.
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WHEREFORE, The Court hereby enters and orders a Decree of Divorce pursuant to
the terms set forth herein.

DATED this

j

H

day of

j

^

, 2009.
BY THE COURT:
THIRD JUDICIAL D,

Decree of Divorce Richms vs Richms Civil No 054902600
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ISi

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I sent via e-mail and regular mail, a copy of the foregoing DECREE
lid, this W
OF DIVORCE to the following, postage prepaid,
MARY PAXMAN MCGEE
1855E.BROOKHILLDR.
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121
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dday of April, 2009:

EXHIBIT "A

19;

TOM D BRANCH LLC
TOM D BRANCH (3997)
Attorney for Respondent
1350 East Draper Parkway
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone (801) 553-1500
Fax(801)553-1550

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RITA Y. RICHINS,

)
)
Petitioner,

)
)

vs.

JAMES E. RICHINS,
Respondent.
STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY TATUM

)
)
)
)

Civil No. 05490-2600
Judge: DENISE LINDBERG
Comrn:

)
: ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Larry Tatum, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows:
1. If called to testify my testimony would be as set forth herein.
2. I have a degree in Accounting from Utah State University, and I've been in the
accounting profession for 40 years.
3. I am a Senior Tax Accountant for Larson & Rosenberger, LLP, located at 9065
South 1300 East in Sandy, Utah 84094.
4. Based on the Court finding the Petitioner had a gross monthly income of
$3,800.00 per month from the July 1, 1998 through May 10, 2005, for a total amount of

82.3 months; considering the income tax at a rate of 33%; and calculating simple interest
of 5% per year; I have calculated the amount due Petitioner.
5. For the first year (1998), the Petitioner would have gross income of $22,800
over six months, coming in at the rate of $3,800 gross per month from July through
December. The total net income with interest at 1.25% (reflecting 5% as reduced to take
into consideration the part year monthly income) for 1998 is therefore $15,466.95.
6. For the year 1999, the Petitioner would have gross income of $45,600, coming
in at the rate of $3,800 per month for the whole year. Her net income with interest at
2.5% (reflecting 5% as reduced to take into consideration the monthly nature of the
income) for 1999 would therefore be $31,315.80; to which I added the interest factor on
the prior year net interest and added that amount of $518.15 to the total, for a balance of
$47,300.90 through the end of 1999.
7. For the years 2000 through 2005 I applied the same calculations.
8. From May 10, 2005 I simply carried forward the calculation and the simple
interest with no additional income considered to the end of February 2009. A summary
of my calculations are as follows:
9. 1998: 22,800 at 1.25%= 285 : 23,085.00 - 33% =

15,466.95

1999: 45,600 at 2.50% = 1,140 : 46,740 - 33% =

31,315.80

Plus 15,466.95 at 5% = 773.35 - 3 3 % =

518.15
47,300.90

2000: 45,600 at 2.50% = 1,140: 46,740-33%=

31,315.80

Plus

1,593.13

47,556.10 at 5% = 2,377.80 - 33% =

80,209.83

2

2001: 45,600 at 2.50%= 1,140: 46,740-33%=

31,315.80

Plus

2,687.03

80,209.83 at 5% = 4,010.49 - 33% =

114,212.66
2002: 45,600 at2.5% = 1,140: 46,740-33%=

31,315.80

Plus

3,826.12

114,212.66 at 5% = 5,710.63-33%=

149,354.58
2003: 45,600 at 2.5% =1,140: 46,740-33%=

31,315.80

Plus

5,003.34

149,354.58 at 5% = 7,467.73 - 33%=

185,673.72
2004: 45,600 at 2.5% =1,140: 46,740-33%=

31,315.80

Plus

6,220.08

185,673.72 at 5% = 9,283.69 - 33%=

223,209.60
2005: 16,340 at 4.15% = 678.11: 17,018.11-33%= 11,402.13
Plus:

223,209.60 at 5% = 11,160.48 - 33%=

7,477.52
242,089.25

2006: 242,089.25 at 5%= 12,104.46-33%=

8,109.99
250,199.24

2007: 250,199.24 at 5%= 12,509.96-33%=

8,381.67
258,580.91

2008: 258,580.91 at 5%= 12,929.04-33%=

8,662.46
267,243.37

2009: 267,243.37 at .83% for 2 months=
2,218.12-33%=
End of February 2009:

O

1,486.14
268,729.51

10. Accordingly, the Petitioner is entitled to $268,729.51 in net income
through February 2009.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT
DATED this

7_ day of February, 2009.

STATE OF UTAH
:ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Larry Tatum, upon providing proper identification verifying his personage, being first
duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that he has read the foregoing document and
knows and understands the contents thereof and agrees to the same. Further, that he
executed the same,
Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s / f ^ ; d a y of February, 2009.

y.

QQttNAMcNAlfl

,

4

——

382C South 610 Weal
SattUtefClty, Utah 84119
My Commission Expires
November 14,2009

State of Utah

EXHIBIT "B"
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